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ABSTRACT 
Information is the single most important part of the decision-making process. There are 
many theories and models of decision-making processes that apply to general decisions, 
and others that are for very specific purposes. No single theory/model applies to all 
decisions. This thesis identifies several relevant theories/models that are both general and 
specific, and explores each process and how information works within and through it to 
reach a decision. This exposes commonalities that all the theories/models share. They are 
identification of the scene, the desired end state, and how to reach the desired end state. 
The successful use of a theory/model requires the person(s) choosing to utilize a 
theory/model to address one or more of these common criteria to reach the best decision 
possible. Additionally, the type of situation and the personalities of the person(s) making 
the decision impact that decision. The person(s) making the decision should understand 
and know this information and how it influences the decision-making process. 
Information influences the decision-making process by influencing how the common 
criteria are answered, how a decision maker responds to the information environment 
effects, and the selection of the model/theory used to reach a decision. 
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Information Operations (IO) is a process that integrates all forms and mediums of 
communication in an attempt to influence the decision-making ability of a target decision 
maker or audience while protecting the ability of the United States to make decisions. 
Much of this process occurs as sub-processes or separate entities that can, when 
appropriate, stand by themselves. The predominant sub-processes are strategic 
communication, joint interagency coordination group, public affairs, civil-military 
operations, cyberspace operations (CO), information assurance, space operations, military 
information support operations (MISO), intelligence, military deception, operations 
security, special technical operations, joint electromagnetic spectrum operations, and key 
leader engagement (JP 3-13, 2012, p. ix).  
The goal of the influence process is to have an adversary decision maker behave 
in a manner that is favorable to the United States, its allies and interests. IO has been 
known by the different names of the sub-processes and used throughout history to 
influence and persuade allies and adversaries alike. While not called information 
operations per se, the integration of many of these sub-processes, or information related 
capabilities, has been demonstrated throughout history as one of the keys to victory in 
battle. 
The importance of influence and persuasion has been widely recognized in 
diplomatic and military writings (e.g., the writings of Aristotle and Sun Tzu). They have 
been studied and applied with varying degrees of success throughout history. 
Practitioners and theorists have focused on how the different tactics (e.g., valence 
framing, vivid appeal) and techniques (e.g., landscaping, emotional appeals) were 
successful. Few investigated why the tactics and techniques (T/T) were so successful and 
no background or information papers were located that discussed the results of the 
interaction of T/T on influence and persuasion. This thesis seeks to address this gap in the 
literature by examining the theories and models that underpin the T/T of IO. Most 
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importantly, this thesis will demonstrate how information plays a role in influencing 
decision making. 
Understanding the role of information in decision making (i.e., the theories and 
models) provides IO with the proof of concept that using a type of T/T has the potential 
to successfully influence or persuade a targeted decision maker or audience to behave in a 
certain manner. Understanding how to manipulate the information to influence decision-
making and behavior is the heart of IO. Without this knowledge, an IO campaign could 
not be tailored to influence a target decision maker or audience and any influence attempt 
may fail.  
Furthermore, successfully influencing a targeted decision maker requires an 
understanding of the varied decision-making processes and models and an understanding 
of information as the stimulus that drives the decision-making process. Thus, 
manipulation of the information and how it is perceived will likely influence the 
perception, the decision, and subsequent behavior. 
The complementary side to this is knowing how to protect against influence 
attempts by an adversary against us. This goes hand-in-hand with understanding how to 
utilize influence T/T, because an adversary may use similar types of T/T against the 
United States. Therefore, if tactics are known, an influence attempt that utilizes them will 
be easier to detect and thwart. This ensures that the United States has the best information 
available to continue to make the best possible decisions in any given situation.  
B. PURPOSE 
Using the lens of the relevant theories and models, this thesis will identify and 
examine how information affects the decision-making process to influence a targeted 
decision maker or audience. Additionally, this thesis will discuss some of the techniques 
and tactics of influence that can potentially affect decision makers.  
1. Primary Research Questions 
Possessing an understanding of the relevant models and theories of decision-
making and how information affects the decision-making process could lead to better use 
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of IO against adversaries and potential adversaries. The primary research question of this 
thesis is: What is information’s role in influencing decision-making?  
2. Secondary Research Questions 
Prior to answering the primary research question, several preliminary questions 
will be answered. The preliminary questions are:   
 What are the most relevant elements of decision-making theories and 
models that apply to IO?   
 How does information affect these theories and models?   
C. SCOPE 
This thesis will encompass three main areas with several sub-sections within each 
main area. The first area will be a discussion of the relevant elements of some of the 
theories and models. The relevant theories examined are:  
 Expected Value Theory (EVT)/Expected Utility Theory (EUT) 
 Economic Human/Rational Man 
 Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) 
 Routine Decision Making 
 Decision Making Under Risk.  
EVT and EUT are theories that seek to find the option that has the most value or 
utility from the point of view (POV) of the decision maker. Economic man and rational 
human theories have identified certain characteristics of an ideal decision maker. NDM is 
a theory that discusses how experts reach a decision. Routine decision making theory 
explores the decision making process of and related to habitual situations. Decision 
making under risk is a theory revealing the decision making process when considering 
possible threat situations. 
The relevant models discussed are: 
 Recognition Primed Decision Making (RPD) 
 Observe-Orient-Decide-Act Loop (OODA)/Critique-Explore-Compare-
Adapt Loop (CECA) 
 Information Operations (IO)   
RPD, utilizing NDM as a foundation, models how experts make decisions. OODA 
illustrates how a decision maker can use information in a given situation to make a 
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decision. CECA builds on and expands OODA to encompass more information from the 
situation and environment surrounding the situation. IO demonstrates the integrated 
strategy for manipulating information to influence the behavior of an adversary decision 
maker or audience.  
The second area considered in this thesis is a description of the information 
environment for influence, the mental picture and examples of influence techniques that 
have the potential to influence a decision maker. The information environment consists of 
three dimensions, physical, cognitive, and informational, that must be considered when 
assessing the impact of information on a specific decision. The decision maker 
inescapably incorporates information from these three dimensions when constructing a 
mental image of the operational environment (i.e., develops situational awareness.) 
Influence techniques provide a mechanism for altering this situational awareness to the 
advantage of an opposing commander. Finally, a description and analysis of how 
information works within the models and theories to influence the decision making 
process that support IO will be included in the third area. This section will demonstrate 
how information influences the decision making process, and is critical to any attempt to 
influence that process.  
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II explores and 
describes some of the relevant theories and models of decision making. The theories are: 
 EVT/EUT 
 Economic Human/Rational Man 
 NDM 
 Routine Decision Making 
 Decision Making Under Risk.  





Chapter III examines and identifies the elements of the decision-making process. 
This chapter also explores the information environment, the development of the mental 
picture, and provides examples of influence techniques.  
Chapter IV describes and explores the information flow through two theories and 
two models. The theories are  
 NDM 
 Decision Making Under Risk 
The models are 
 RPD 
 OODA/CECA 
The analysis explores the possible characteristics of the theories and models, proposes 
techniques and tactics that could be used to influence the characteristics, and the sub-
processes of IO that could be used in the influence attempt. 
Chapter V provides a conclusion to this research. Information, influence and 
decision making will be discussed. Areas of research in the future are identified. 
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II. DECISION MAKING: THEORIES AND MODELS 
One theme that emerges from this research is that no single process will 
explain all kinds of decisions. 
—Arthur B. Markman and Douglas L. Medin1 
Exactly how a human decision maker arrives at a decision is largely a mystery 
that will not be solved in the foreseeable future. However, the last century of theory and 
research has “uncovered substantial and systematic regularities in how people make 
decisions and has led to the formulation of general psychological principles that 
characterize decision-making behaviors” (Leboeuf & Shafir, 2005, p. 243). These 
principles are applicable for decisions of very large magnitude, like ones involving the 
risk of lives, and very small orders of magnitude, such as what to eat for lunch. While a 
century of study has produced many ideas, eleven theories and models are recognized as 
having built upon each other to explain decision-making (Simon, 1956; Lichtenstein & 
Slovic, 1971; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986; Persky, 1995; Hollnagel, 2007; Edwards, 
2009). The theories and models are: expected utility and expected value, the economic 
human and rational man, naturalistic decision making, decision making under risk, 
routine decision making, explanation based decision making, recognition primed decision 
making model, the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act loop and the Critique-Explore-Compare-
Adapt Loop. While these theories and models represent the broad areas in decision 
making research, they do not drill down to the lowest level to explain what an individual 
leader or decision making entity thinks or will do. At the most basic level, a theory needs 
to note the systematic regularities which best describe the decision making process 
irrespective of nationality, race, gender or point of view. Further, even though these 
models and theories are important and provide the necessary underpinnings for 
Information Operations (IO), none work without information. Information is the ignition 
and fuel that drives all the theories and models.  
                                                 
1 Arthur Markman and Douglas Medin, “Decision-making”, in Stevens’ Handbook of Experimental 
Psychology Third Edition, ed. Douglas Medin and Hal Pashler (New York; John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
2002), 429.  
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A. THEORIES  
1. Expected Utility and Expected Value Theory 
a. Expected Value Theory 
Expected Value Theory (EVT) was originally designed for economics. EVT 
states: “The expected value of a bet is found by multiplying the value of each possible 
outcome by its probability of occurrence and summing these products across all possible 
outcomes” (Edwards, 2009, p. 11). Psychologists recognized they could utilize EVT in 
explaining the choices people make and how decision making works. A decision maker 
that uses EVT is constrained by the monetary value of an object or decision. This 
prevents the decision maker from including information in the decision process that could 
result in a better decision being made (e.g., the cost of a computer is higher than another 
but it is more compatible with legacy systems than the other computer that executes the 
same function but costs less and is not as compatible with legacy systems). This 
constraint was acknowledged by economists and the theory was changed to include the 
utility of an object or decision. This resulted in the Expected Utility Theory (EUT). 
b. Expected Utility Theory 
EUT states, “…the overall utility of an option is the sum of the weighted utilities 
of the attributes” (Markman & Medin, 2002, p. 416). This means a decision maker can 
consider more than the expected monetary value or gain of an object or decision; such as 
national pride or an object to which a decision maker has an emotional attachment. This 
also means a decision maker could decide a short term loss is worth the expected long-
term gain (Edwards, 2009). In other words, from the point of view (POV) of the decision 
maker the knowledge and understanding that the short-term loss could be overcome by 
the long-term gain and be of greater utility entices the decision maker to absorb the short-
term loss. However, utility is not defined in this theory and it is left to the decision maker 
to define what is of importance to the person or the organization (e.g., the sentimental 
value of a picture, a ring, or the rights and freedoms granted by law). The lack of 
definition gives EUT a wider range of applicability than EVT. This makes EUT better 
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suited to a military decision maker because they can determine the utility of an object, 
decision or event and make a better decision.  
2. Economic Human and Rational Man 
The next two theories, economic human and rational man, shift the focus from the 
utility of the decision to the decision maker. The theories try to describe and capture how 
a person makes a decision in order to predict what decision may be reached in the future. 
The first theory classifies the decision maker as the economic human (Homo 
Economicus) (Persky, 1995; Edwards, 2009, Hollnagel, 2007). To qualify as Homo 
Economicus, a decision maker has to be 
 completely informed 
 infinitely sensitive and  
 rational (Edwards, 2009; Hollnagel, 2007).  
Being completely informed means the decision maker has all relevant and necessary 
information to know what the alternatives are and what their outcomes could be. 
Possessing infinite sensitivity means the decision maker can identify the differences 
between the alternatives and make a decision based on those differences. And being 
rational means, “…that alternatives can be put into a weak ordering and that choices are 
made so as to maximize something” (Hollnagel, 2007, p. 3). As with EVT/EUT, 
psychology adopted and adapted these theories producing the theory of rational man. 
Despite adapting the theories to be psychologically friendly, the theories were still too 
narrow in scope (e.g., Simon, 1956; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1986; Slovic, 1995; LeBoeuf & Shafir, 2005). The theories failed to account for 
limitations such as time, memory capacity, fatigue, and the biases or preferences of a 
decision maker. In considering the three qualifications for rational man, a decision maker 
fails to be completely informed because the decision maker cannot fully consider all 
options or alternatives available; it is just not possible (Leboeuf & Shafir, 2005). Second, 
the decision maker could discriminate between most of the options but the vast amount of 
permutations that could be available for the options prevent a decision maker from 
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possessing infinite sensitivity. And finally, rationality fails because of the biases and 
preferences of the decision maker (Leboeuf & Shafir, 2005; Lippmann, 1922).  
Fatigue, as noted above, is just one of many ways to indicate the limited cognitive 
ability of the decision makers. The brain can only process so much information before 
shutting down or finding some way to reduce the cognitive workload (i.e., the use of a 
heuristic). Thus, decision makers make decisions in a bounded reality. A decision maker 
only has certain amount of time, energy, cognitive power or memory capacity to use. 
These are examples of many constraints (e.g., time, biases, and preferences) that are 
ignored by the models. One way that a decision maker deals with such constraints is by 
finding a solution that is satisficing. Satisficing is the 80% solution. The decision maker 
is searching for the “optimal” solution but will be satisfied with a solution once it passes 
some point only the decision maker knows or deems appropriate. Thus, a solution is 
“good enough” (Evans, Over, & Manktelow, 2008; Hollnagel, 2007; Simon, 1956).  
It is not possible to extensively investigate all options, but a decision maker can 
use the time they have, their own cognitive ability and that of their support group (e.g., 
aides or cabinet members) to reach a decision. Most, if not all, of the time this is done 
with the use of heuristics. Heuristics are “…simplification strategies which repress 
awareness of uncertainty and create a simplified view of the information” (Williams, 
2007, p. 45). Heuristics can be thought of as rules of thumb. They can make large 
amounts of information easier to understand and manage, and can shorten the amount of 
time needed to reach an answer. Research has shown that people rely on heuristics 
because they are fast and frugal. “For the real environment is altogether too big, too 
complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal with so 
much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and combinations” (Lippmann, 
1922, p. 11). Use of heuristics reduces the cognitive stress load and could allow a 
decision maker to think about the different options, the differences between the options 
and which option is the best. Thus, a decision is reached under the imposed limitations 
(e.g., time, cognitive ability, bias) (Williams, 2007; Lippmann, 1922).  
Rational man is the ideal; and most decision makers violate the three criteria 
above. They do not fit the ideal and are not, therefore, “rational”.  
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3. Naturalistic Decision Making 
Much of the research prior to 1989 was focused on finding the best option or 
making the optimal choice based on all available options without regard to the real world 
or context of the situation (i.e., EVT/EUT, and Economic Human/Rational Man). 
Researchers knew the flaws inherent in classical decision making theory but had a hard 
time breaking the paradigm to reach theories and models that would explain decisions 
(e.g., routine, non-routine or novel) in the real world (Klein & Salas, 2001). Naturalistic 
decision making (NDM) presented a new paradigm designed to encompass and address 
the flaws and inadequacies of previous models and theories by describing what decision 
makers do to make decisions (Klein & Salas, 2001; Klein, 1997). Caroline Zsambok 
introduced NDM as 
…how experienced people, working as individuals or groups in dynamic, 
uncertain, and often fast paced environments, identify and assess their 
situation, make decisions and take actions whose consequences are 
meaningful to them and to the larger organization in which they operate. 
(Zsambok, 1997, p. 5)  
NDM is how an expert makes a decision and/or gives advice in the real world (i.e., under 
time pressure and with ambiguous/incomplete information) (Zsambok, 1997; Markman & 
Medin, 2002). The phrase “give advice” is used because the expert may not be the final 
decision maker and may have the role of aiding in the process of decision making as in 
being the Chief of Naval Operations who advises the President on military matters unique 
to the Navy. Attempting to use classical decision making processes (e.g., EVT/EUT) 
under the constraints of the real world produces unsatisfactory decisions. Decisions that 
benefit from using classical decision processes are those that do not have a time 
constraint (i.e., constraint is relative to the situation years/months versus minutes/hours), 
the identified problem does not change, and/or the different stakeholders are involved in 
the process (i.e., if the identified problem is building a new office park then the 
contractors, building owner, and interested businesses all have a say or are informed of 
what is happening) (Klein, 1997). But NDM is not designed for such problems; it is 
designed for real world settings. 
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NDM, in considering the process used by experts and laymen in making 
decisions, takes into account the context or nature of the situation in which the decision is 
being made, the prior experience of the decision maker, and any relevant restraints or 
constraints. For this thesis an expert is an individual who has extensive experience in a 
subject or in decision making. A layman is an individual who has a small amount or 
conversational knowledge on a subject.  
Thus, models of naturalistic decision making attempt to address how 
people can make decisions in situations where the conditions are changing 
over time, where information is ambiguous, and where the plausibility of 
potential goals and courses of action is shifting over time. (Zsambok, 
Beach and Klein, 1992, p.18)  
Experts are better at making decisions than laymen because their experiences capacitated 
the development of a knowledge structure or schema. Utilizing his or her knowledge 
structure the expert can very quickly “see” cues and indicators that provide information 
about what is happening, or generate specific questions to have those at the scene give 
him or her the most comprehensive picture possible. This is an advantage as long as the 
expert has correctly identified the situation, otherwise what s/he “sees” will not inform 
the picture any better than what is seen or reported. If the problem has been correctly 
identified the expert will gather all the relevant information that s/he has access to and 
generate options to solve the problem. Many times the solution is one of the first, if not 
the first, option generated. If the expert is only slightly familiar or completely unfamiliar 
with the situation, s/he will fall back on classical decision making process, as a layman 
would, but s/he would move through the process faster due to their experience at making 
decisions (Klein, 1997; Markman & Medin, 2002). The expert would utilize their 
knowledge structure to identify the information they need to make a decision. If time 
does not permit or limits information gathering, then an expert can make a plausible 
guess about that information (Markman & Medin, 2002). This results in the most 
comprehensive mental model available for the decision maker to reach a decision. A 
layman could reach the same decision, using the same process but the time necessary to 
do so would be longer regardless of the problem or situation. 
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A large part of reaching a decision is how an expert or layman approaches the 
problem. A layman may not have an approach at all or a very limited one due to being 
inexperienced. An expert could have very definitive one or many approaches depending 
on how familiar they are with the problem (i.e., a familiar problem has a definitive 
structure while an unfamiliar one has a general, multipurpose structure). These 
approaches tell experts and layman what information is needed to make the best decision 
possible. But, as has been shown, expert approaches are better constructed and can be 
moved through faster than a layman’s approach.  
NDM is considered to be a useful theory because application of the theory 
supports practical solutions in the everyday world (Klein & Salas, 2001). Use of the 
theory enables decision makers (e.g., expert or layman) to design decision process 
models allowing better decisions. One such model is the Recognition Primed Decision 
Making (RPD) model (the first model in the model section). 
4. Decision Making under Risk       
What is risk?  How do you define or describe what qualifies as a risk or just 
something that is uncertain or ambiguous?  The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and 
Reasoning defines risk as: “when the probabilities of the outcomes are known (e.g., 
gambling or insurance)” and ambiguous as: “the precise likelihoods are not known and 
must be estimated by the decision maker” (LeBoeuf & Shafir, 2005, p. 244). The 
Cambridge definition delineates a risky decision from an ambiguous situation by the 
degree of information a decision maker has about that situation (i.e., does the decision 
maker have enough information to identify the situation as a risk?). EUT/EVT would 
define a risky situation as dependent upon the degree of probability of the outcome. 
However, neither the amount of information a decision maker has nor whether the exact 
probabilities of an outcome are known matters. The only thing that matters is the 
outcome and, more importantly, the magnitude of the outcome, positive or negative 
(Williams, 2007). Therefore, a risky decision is dependent upon the magnitude of the 
impact the risk could have on the situation (i.e., the degree to which a possible outcome 
can adversely impact the mission, ship, equipment, or crew). Determining risk is close to 
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EUT/EVT because a decision maker has to consider and weigh the possibilities in order 
to act on or mitigate them. This should start with the decision makers recognizing their 
approach to risk as either being risk seeking or risk adverse. They, or their aides, should 
also know how they perceive risk and what their propensity is for taking risk. This 
information can help the decision makers protect themselves from influence attempts and 
knowledge of an adversaries risk perception and propensity could open avenues of 
influence. 
Williams says, “An important feature of any decision is the degree of uncertainty 
associated with future outcomes” (Williams, 2007, p. 43). Given that risk is dependent 
upon unknown future outcomes, people make risky decisions every day and humans have 
multiplied and prospered based on these risk decisions (e.g., where to live, who to marry, 
etc.). The decisions made had to balance risk versus reward because risk is a constant in 
the process (Williams, 2007; Keil, Wallace, Turk, Dixon-Randall, & Nulden, 2000). The 
decision may be something small in magnitude such as opening the hatch without looking 
through the porthole. This is a low magnitude risk because if someone is there they will 
be bumped by the hatch and will probably not be significantly injured (if at all) and the 
ability of the ship to execute the mission(s) assigned should be unaffected. Also, the 
sailor opening the hatch will not be significantly delayed in their duties by having to wait 
for the passageway to clear before reopening the hatch and continuing on with what they 
were doing. An example of a high magnitude risk is carrying a heavy box containing a 
high value piece of equipment up or down a ladder without the help of a second sailor. It 
is high risk because the sailor might not be strong enough to handle it and fall down the 
ladder breaking bones, damaging the ladder and/or the item in the box may break and the 
ship would not be able to repair a necessary piece of equipment (e.g., a gyroscope) 
preventing it from getting underway. The risks in both of these examples were to 
personnel and ship. The magnitude of the outcome is the difference between the high and 
low risk decisions based on the effect it will have on the ability of the ship or 
organization to complete the mission(s) assigned. 
The success or failure of the decision making process depends on our perceptions, 
attitudes and actions towards risk (i.e., how we see it). This is more formally known as 
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risk perception. Risk perception is defined as “…a decision maker’s assessment of the 
risk inherent in a situation” (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992, p.12; Keil et al, 2000). People usually 
see risk as a negative aspect of a situation due to what could be lost. But a risk could be 
good or bad depending on the risk perception of a decision maker and how that risk is 
presented (i.e., how it is framed). Such framing is termed valence framing. Valence is 
defined as: “The attractiveness of an object or activity to a person” (Edwards, 2009, p. 
10). While investigating valence framing, researchers have found that losing something 
(e.g., money or time) elicits a stronger pain reaction than the positive reaction to finding 
or being given something (Pratkanis, 2007). Basically, humans do not like to lose 
anything (e.g., time, money, life) and that loss hurts (Williams, 2007; Markman & Medin, 
2002). This is why the majority of situations view risk as or have it presented as bad. 
Humans have a stronger reaction to a negative risk frame than a positive risk frame 
(Markman & Medin, 2002). Despite risk being viewed as bad, deciding to act on a risky 
decision could have a large magnitude positive consequence such as starting a small 
computing company that becomes a multi-billion dollar firm (e.g., Apple and Micro-
soft). The perception of that risk (i.e., the positive or negative valence frame) could nudge 
the decision one way or the other (Williams, 2007; Keil et al, 2000). 
The decision maker, and his or her aides/cabinet, should also understand the 
propensity of the decision maker for risk. Risk propensity is the concept that a decision 
maker will have consistent tendencies towards risky behavior (i.e., whether they will take 
or avoid behavior that could be risky) (Kogan & Wallach, 1964; Harnett & Cummings, 
1980; Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Keil et al, 2000, p. 146). As with risk perception, risk 
propensity should be known in order to be protected from adversaries and the adversary 
decision maker’s propensity should be known or discovered to influence them.  
Two more behaviors that are subsets of risk propensity are risk seeking and risk 
aversion. Risk seeking is defined as holding the preference to choose the more risky 
option than the certain option while risk aversion is choosing the certainty option over the 
risky one (LeBoeuf & Sharif, 2005). These behaviors validate a decision maker’s 
consistent tendencies towards risk. Thus, an analysis of a decision maker’s previous 
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decisions in risky situations, if known, will expose their risk propensity. The same 
analysis could also indicate the decision maker’s risk perception (Keil et al, 2000).  
Risk perception and propensity are vulnerable to the influence of valence framing 
(Williams, 2007; Keil et al, 2000). 
The general finding is that in the positive frame, people demonstrate a bias 
toward risk-averse behavior choosing the certain option over the risky 
option, and in the negative frame, a bias toward risk-seeking behavior 
choosing the risky option over the certain option. (Williams, 2007, p. 46; 
LeBoeuf & Shafir, 2005; Keil et al, 2000)  
The frame people view the risk in is the frame the risk is presented in because most 
people do not think about the problem or risk situation in another way or from another 
angle (LeBoeuf & Shafir, 2005; Keil et al, 2000). Therefore, the valence frame may 
manipulate how the risk itself is seen whether it is an attribute of a choice or object (i.e., 
the performance benefits of a new computer operating system), or a behavior (i.e., what 
the decision maker could gain or lose). Regardless of the positive or negative valance of 
the risk decision, if the decision maker is constrained (e.g., lack of time or information), 
the decision may be made on the basis of the decision maker’s use of known heuristics.  
Researchers investigating risk decision making have identified four common 
heuristics used in making risky decisions: (1) availability, (2) representativeness,  
(3) anchor and adjustment, and (4) overconfidence (Williams, 2007). Availability and 
representativeness are drawn from NDM because the decision maker has a template or 
uses feature matching for the risk situation. Template matching refers to a situation that 
has been seen before and contains the knowledge that taking certain actions will alleviate 
the situation or accomplish the mission. Feature matching addresses aspects of the new 
situation that are similar to past situations, which can lead to a solution being found. 
Availability is how fast information is retrieved from memory about that type of situation 
or something similar to it (i.e., template or feature matching). The scale of the event (i.e., 
how much press it got) or how familiar the decision maker is with the situation will 
determine how quickly it is retrieved from memory (Williams, 2007). Availability also 
becomes a source of bias because if the past event was small in scale, retrieval from 
memory will take longer (if at all) and will be less available. Representativeness is how 
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the decision maker believes that situation A goes with category B (i.e., feature matching). 
Thus, if the decision maker sees a dark sheen on the water by the ship, recalls from 
memory what an oil leak looks like, compares these two sets of information and decides 
that it is or isn’t an oil leak and takes further action from there. 
The last two heuristics, anchor and adjustment and overconfidence, are examples 
of RPD. Like NDM, these heuristics start with template or feature matching and use 
information to build or adjust the mental model or picture.  
Anchor and adjustment involves applying new information to a situation the 
decision maker is already aware of (i.e., template matching). The situation is known, new 
information comes in and decisions are made based on the new situation (Williams, 
2007). The final heuristic, overconfidence, is self-explanatory. Overconfidence has a 
relationship with risk perception and risk propensity. If a decision maker’s perception of 
risk in a situation is low, the decision maker may not perceive information that a situation 
is risker than originally thought (i.e., the information disconfirms the decision maker’s 
mental model) and will, therefore, take more risky actions (Williams, 2007; Keil et al, 
2000). This could lead a decision maker to believe s/he has made the correct decision and 
then use this “correct” decision to increase their self-efficacy in making risky decision, 
which may change or reinforce their risk propensity toward risk seeking.  
5. Routine Decision Making 
Most decisions that are made in a given day are routine. Whether they have been 
learned over a lifetime (e.g., eating breakfast) or a choice made in the last few months 
(e.g., running every morning), they are decisions that are small in magnitude and done 
with little cognitive effort. Betsch and colleagues defined routine as: “An option that 
comes to mind as a solution when the decision maker recognizes a particular decision 
problem (combination of goal and context conditions)” (Betsch, Haberstroh, & Höhle, 
2002, p. 456). Thus, a routine is something a decision maker does not really think about 
and expects at some regular time interval (e.g., reporting for muster every day at 0730). A 
routine could become habit. A habit is simply a type of routine, like eating breakfast, 
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something done on a regular basis over an extended period of time (Betsch, Haberstroh, 
& Höhle, 2002).  
Routine, as defined, is not a heuristic. The heuristics described above are used to 
solve a problem or find a solution to a newly confronted situation (as in RPD and NDM). 
Routines are known situations that already have template solutions and answers. They 
were encountered so frequently by the decision maker that the template is readily 
retrieved in short order (i.e., the memory is easily found). Thus, a routine is similar in 
appearance to a heuristic but its essence is very different.  
Routine can hinder or help a decision maker. Unfortunately routine often leads to 
complacency. Decision makers become complacent when they overly rely on heuristics 
or automated processes such as relying on GPS for navigation. They lose situational 
awareness, believing the computer will alert them to trouble or the heuristic is satisfying 
enough to ensure safety and completion of the task. For example, the USS 
GREENEVILLE, SSN 772, was conducting a routine emergency surfacing maneuver and 
surfaced under a Japanese fishing trawler, the EHIME MARU, sinking the vessel and 
taking the lives of nine Japanese fishermen (Shattuck & Miller, 2006). The maneuver was 
conducted under time pressure (i.e., a limitation) and the crew took shortcuts and 
assumed the Commanding Officer (CO) (i.e., the decision maker) knew all the relevant 
information. Their sensors and computers displayed the information that the EHIME 
MARU was closing but the crew overrode that information because the CO stated he 
understood all the information (Shattuck & Miller, 2006). Thus, the crew decided to trust 
the CO more than the computer and denied the CO the necessary information to have a 
full picture of the situation (i.e., the crew acknowledged the information but it 
contradicted the routine of safely surfacing and knowing the CO had previously been 
correct after making such statements, see routine effect seven below) (Betsch, 
Haberstroh, & Höhle, 2002). The CO failed to seek information that would completely 
inform his picture because he was confident he had not seen any surface vessels and very 
familiar with the maneuver. They executed the maneuver with tragic results.  
The crew was very familiar with emergency surfacing and knew what to do and 
what to expect. But it was routine to trust the CO when he said he had an understanding 
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of the information. The CO and crew lost or ignored information necessary for their 
situational awareness. The maneuver was routine until they surfaced under another ship.  
Routine impacts decisions and decision making; researchers have found several 
models that predict parts of the routine decision making process but they have yet to find 
one single model that encompasses all aspects of routine decision-making. Further, 
researchers have identified several of the effects routine has on the process of decision 
making. For ease of impact identification the process has been broken down into four 
phases (Betsch, Haberstroh, & Höhle, 2002). Different researchers have identified these 
phases as common to most if not all decision making processes and used various 
nomenclatures to distinguish them. They are, in the most general terms, (1) start,  
(2) pre-selection, (3) selection, and (4) post-selection (Betsch, Haberstroh, & Höhle, 
2002; Zsambok, Beach & Klein, 1992; Hey, Lotito, & Maffioletti, 2010; Bordley, 2001).  
The start phase is the beginning of the process when the decision maker is 
presented with a new situation that requires attention. The pre-selection phase is an 
information gathering phase. The information may come from aides, experts, 
subordinates, or from the decision maker’s own memory of past events that are similar to 
the current. The selection phase is the point at which the decision maker has or thinks 
s/he has enough information about the situation to form a solution and decides upon the 
solution. The post-selection phase is the action/behavior phase where the solution is 
executed (Betsch, Haberstroh, & Höhle, 2002; Zsambok, Beach & Klein, 1992; Hey, 
Lotito, & Maffioletti, 2010; Bordley, 2001). Researchers have identified ten routine 
effects on decision making. They are: 
 Identification of selection problem causes routine activation from 
memory. 
 Recognition of selection problem can directly invoke selection of routine 
behavior. 
 Routine strength matters: the higher the frequency of prior behavior 
repetition, the higher the likelihood of immediate selection of the routine 
behavior. 
 Depth of information search decreases with increasing routine strength. 
 Elaborateness of search strategies decreases with increasing routine 
strength. 
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 In similar decision making situations, the tendency towards confirmatory 
information search increases with increasing routine strength. 
 The impact of encoded information that contradicts routine choice 
decreases with increasing routine strength under time pressure, but also in 
unconstrained situations. 
 The likelihood of routine choice in a situation that suggests deviation from 
the routine is moderated by context factors: 
 time pressure provokes routine maintenance; 
 perceived novelty of the situation provokes routine deviation. 
 Routines can influence behavior independent from intentions. 
 Intention-behavior relation is moderated by routine strength (Betsch, 
Haberstroh, & Höhle, 2002, p. 458). 
Table 1 summarizes the relationships between phase, effect and researcher 
(Betsch, Haberstroh, & Höhle, 2002). These effects apply to any routine decision making 
process. Understanding the potential effects of routines on decision-making, a decision 
maker can use them or mitigate them when making a decision. 
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Phase Process Routine Effect Reference 
Start Identification of selection 
problem, options and criteria. 
1. Identification of selection problem 
causes routine activation from 
memory. 
2. Recognition of selection problem can 
directly invoke selection of routine 
behavior. 
3. Routine strength matters: the higher 
the frequency of prior behavior 
repetition, the higher the likelihood of 
immediate selection of the routine 
behavior. 
Aarts & Dijksterhuis (2000) 
Klein (1989) 
 
Oulette & Wood (1998) 
Ronis et al. (1989) 
 
Oulette & Wood (1998) 
Ronis et al. (1989) 
 
Pre-Selection Information search, editing 
process. 
4. Depth of information search decreases 
with increasing routine strength. 
5. Elaborateness of search strategies 
decreases with increasing routine 
strength. 
6. In similar decision making situations, 
the tendency towards confirmatory 
information search increases with 
increasing routine strength. 
Aarts, Verplanken, & van Knippenberg (1997) 
 
 
Aarts, Verplanken, & van Knippenberg (1997) 
 
 
Betsch et al. (2001, exp. 2) 
Selection Evaluation of criteria, application 
of a decision rule. 
7. The impact of encoded information 
that contradicts routine choice 
decreases with increasing routine 
strength under time pressure, but also 
in unconstrained situations. 
8. The likelihood of routine choice in a 
situation that suggests deviation from 
the routine is moderated by context 
factors: 
(a) time pressure provokes routine 
maintenance; 
(b) perceived novelty of the 
situation provokes routine 
deviation. 
Baumann, Brown, Fontana, & Cameron (1993) 
Betsch et al. (1999) 




Betsch et al. (1998) 
Post-Selection Behavior implementation 9. Routines can influence behavior 





10. Intention-behavior relation is 
moderated by routine strength. 
Bagozzi (1981) 
Beck & Ajzen (1991) 
Bentler & Speckart (1979) 
Fredricks & Dossett (1983) 
Landis, Triandis, & Adamopoulos (1978) 
 
Mittal (1988) 
Montano & Taplin (1991) 
Verplanken, Aarts, van Knippenberg & Moonen (1998) 
Table 1.   Routine Effects in the Process of Decision Making. (from Betsch, Haberstroh, & Höhle, 2002, p. 458) 
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6. Explanation Based Decision Making 
The decisions that are made have to be explained at some point. Whether it is to a 
senior officer or to the stockholders, the decision to act must be based on evidence or 
information of some sort. Of particular importance are large magnitude decisions that 
affect a person’s life such as decisions in law, politics, medicine and diplomacy (Hastie & 
Pennington, 2000). Hastie and Pennington defined explanation as: “a mental 
representation of the situation relevant to the decision, with an emphasis on causally 
significant events, conditions and relationships.” (Hastie & Pennington, 2000, p. 213; 
Lippmann, 1922)  Therefore, explanation based decision making (EBDM) is assumed to 
make the decision based solely on the available information in a passionless manner and 
decision makers create a version of that information as the explanation of the final 
decision (Hastie & Pennington, 2000; Lippmann, 1922). It must be looked in the context 
of what the situation is and who the actors are. In this way, the individual decision maker 
can accurately evaluate the evidence with each individual decision maker developing a 
different, yet similar mental representation of the evidence (Hastie & Pennington, 2000).  
EBDM is more applicable to non-routine or novel decisions in which the decision 
makers have little or no experience or knowledge. It is these situations that demand 
evaluation and synthesis of the information received or evidence presented (Hastie & 
Pennington, 2000; Zsambok, Beach & Klein, 1992). This is especially true for novel or 
non-routine decisions such as first time car buying, being a juror in a criminal case or 
when deciding to merge two large companies. The major feature of EBDM is evaluating 
the information in a passionless manner and making a choice on information alone (e.g., 
gas mileage, safety rating, evidence, motivation, cost benefit analysis). This singular 
reliance on information is what separates EBDM from all other forms of decision-making 
models and theories, and makes it very applicable to military decision makers. 
B. MODELS  
1. Recognition Primed Decision Making Model    
Where the NDM covers all decision maker levels of experience, RPD is designed 
to model how the expert makes decisions in his/her area of expertise. RPD has three 
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critical assertions at the core of the model. The first and most critical is, as Gary Klein 
states in his book Naturalistic Decision Making: “The most critical assertion of the RPD 
model is that people can use experience to generate a plausible option as the first one they 
consider” (Klein, 1997, p. 288). This means that a decision maker or an advisor who has 
dealt with a particular situation will be able to assess the situation faster and more readily 
produce or recommend a course of action that has the most potential of solving the 
problem, versus someone who utilizes a classical decision-making strategy (i.e., 
EVT/EUT) (Zsambok & Klein, 1997; Markman & Medin, 2002). The plausible option 
generated first is also the strongest option. A decision maker may generate other options 
but they are not of the same high quality as the first one (Klein, 1997).2 The second 
assertion is that a decision maker who has significant experience should not be adversely 
affected by time pressure because s/he uses pattern matching. The decision maker takes 
the information about the scene and compares it to a previously encountered situation 
(i.e., the decision maker retrieves a memory). This allows the decision maker to 
understand what could reasonably be accomplished, use the directed telescope to find 
important information, look for cues that indicate whether the plan is working, and make 
decisions for follow on actions (Klein, 1989).  
The third assertion of the RPD model is an experienced decision maker can select 
a course of action and not have to compare other courses of action. A decision maker, 
building off the first two assertions, choses a course of action without comparing it to 
others because his/her experience enables one to identify and understand the scene, and 
go with an action that may succeed in solving the problem (Klein, 1997).3 
A decision maker uses pattern or feature matching (i.e., use of mental models) and 
story building to diagnose what s/he is viewing or being told about because there is an 
amount of uncertainty in what is happening. “Diagnosis is the attempt to link the 
observed events to causal factors; by establishing such a linkage the decision maker 
would obtain an explanation for the events” (Klein, 1997, p. 290). Diagnosing an event is 
                                                 
2 For a full discussion of this assertion see Klein, Wolf, Militello, & Zsambok, 1995 and Calderwood, 
Klein, & Crandell, 1988.  
3 Full discussions and empirical data for the last two assertions can be found in Calderwood, Klein, & 
Crandell, 1988 and Klein, 1989 and Kaempf, Wolf, Thordsen, & Klein, 1992. 
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very important because it better informs the decision maker as to the nature and context 
of a situation, which greatly influences the selection of an action. Feature matching, 
explained above, helps to identify a situation through categorization, which means once 
the situation is known it can be dealt with in a similar fashion as other situations in the 
same category. Story building involves mental simulation of events in order to find a 
causal explanation of events. The benefit of using this is being able to simulate what 
could happen when using a certain course of action and/or walk back in time from the 
first observation of the event in order to simulate and determine what the prior causal 
factors could have been.  
RPD is focused on how experts make decisions. While the differences between 
experts and layman are many, the RPD model shows several areas that laymen could 
learn and improve their decision-making capabilities. Experts are creating a more 
accurate mental picture from the beginning, learning what information is needed to build 
a better mental picture, better identification of the most appropriate option, and when or 
where to apply that option (Lipshitz & Shaul, 1997). These areas are improved through 
classroom training and real world experience. Further, RPD reinforces and displays the 
theory of satisficing because the limits of the real world make it impossible to execute a 
thorough and time consuming deliberation about the options (Klein, 1989). But laymen 
and experts are required to make decisions in real world situations that move quickly in 
several directions at once without all the relevant information (Zsambok, 1997). The 
confluence of uncertainty, of rapidly changing context, and constraint of time may result 
in bad and wrong decisions; worse yet, no decision will be made and the situation will 
continue to deteriorate to the point of destruction. Figure 1 shows the RPD Model. 
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Figure 1.   The RPD Model (from Klein, 1997, p. 286) 
2. Observe-Orient-Decide-Act Loop and the Critique-Explore-Compare-
Adapt Loop  
a. Observe-Orient-Decide-Act Loop 
The observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop has been a staple in military 
decision making since it was designed and published in the late 1960s by Colonel John 
Boyd, USAF (Ret.). The OODA Loop was developed “…to understand the success of 
American F-86 Sabre pilots versus opponents flying the technologically superior MiG-
15” (Bryant, 2006, p. 184). Through his work, Colonel Boyd discovered that American 
fighter pilots gained a distinct advantage in air-to-air engagements by ascertaining what 
the enemy was doing, how it could hurt him, and acting to counter or pre-empt the enemy 
tactic. Pilots used NDM/RPD after becoming experts on MiG tactics (e.g., the pilots 
studied gun camera footage and discussed the previous engagement movement by 
movement) and recognized the information while engaged in combat and applied that 
information to the stored mental model in order to reach the solution that enabled them to 
shoot down the MiGs they fought (McIntosh, 2011). Thus, the faster the pilots worked 
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through this process (i.e., the OODA loop), the faster they could gain the advantage by 
getting inside the MiG pilot’s OODA loop and shoot them down (Bryant, 2006). Being 
able to get inside an adversaries loop creates a mismatch between what is actually 
occurring in the environment and what is being modeled in their head (i.e., the 
development of their mental model). This causes confusion, forcing the adversary to 
lengthen their loop. This lengthening could paralyze their decision-making process or 
cause them to make a decision based off of incomplete information. Thus, an adversary 
cannot reach a decision or the decision they make benefits us, which potentially leads to 
their defeat (Fadok, 1997). Figure 2 illustrates the OODA Loop. 
The OODA loop took the world by storm but that was half a century ago. It is a 
great design for a basic decision process at the tactical or small unit level but has not been 
updated to include the last fifty years of cognitive development research, such as goal 
directed cognition and mental models (Bryant, 2006). Goal directed cognition states that 
people are interested in and about the world and society they live in, and mental models 
are “situational representations that maps elements of an external system (a problem, 
situation, or event) and the interrelationships among those elements onto a conceptual 
structure” (Bryant, 2006, p. 188). Updating OODA to include these and other 
developments would allow OODA to apply to more complex situations and events 
beyond the small unit level, to encompass task group and battle group maneuvers. 
However, there are cultural and practical reasons why the military will not retire OODA 
in favor of a more inclusive theory and model (McIntosh, 2011). OODA is well 
established in the military and it is a relatively simple theory that can be understood and 
used by the most junior decision maker. Additionally, OODA is intentionally vague and 
while this vagueness does prevent it from describing more complex problems, it provides 
latitude in defining what is included in each stage and how to act or react to that stage 
(e.g., a commander could insert if-then statements in their battle orders). The latitude 
allows a commander and subordinates to craft unique definitions for themselves and a 
particular situation. The vagueness has also made the OODA loop a practical tool for 
anyone seeking to gain an advantage over adversaries in their field (e.g., military, 
business, or sports) (McIntosh, 2011).  
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Figure 2.   OODA Loop (from Bryant, 2006, p. 184) 
b. Critique-Explore-Compare-Adapt Loop 
Building and expanding on the OODA loop framework is the Critique-Explore-
Compare-Adapt Loop (CECA). CECA was developed by David J. Bryant of Defense 
Research and Development, Canada. It is designed to model command and control (C2) 
processes in alignment with the last 50 years of cognitive psychological advancement that 
views it in a more ecological context. That is, more attention is given to how the mind 
adapts to the interaction between the mind and environment, and the internal 
representations of the world (Bryant, 2003; Wilson, 2002).  
CECA, unlike OODA, is not really circular. It has four main areas (CECA) and 
five sub-areas: conceptual model, situational model, information gathering, filtering, and 
directed telescope (Bryant, 2003 & 2006; Van Creveld, 1985). It can be considered a loop 
because the process through the sub-areas and main areas does go in order and is 
continuous, which can be seen as circular. However, some parts happen simultaneously 
once an operation begins. The process starts with the sub-area conceptual model (i.e., the 
mental model). “The conceptual model will be a representation of how the operation is 
intended to proceed” (Bryant, 2006, p. 193). This will be the common picture of the 
operation that informs everyone involved how the operation is supposed to go and it 
should guide their actions and what information they should seek (Bryant, 2003). Next, 
the situational model is developed. The situational model, essentially, takes a snap shot of 
the operation at any given moment in time to evaluate how the operation is proceeding in 
relation to the mental model in order to validate assumptions in the plan and look for 
 28
indications that the assumptions were wrong (Bryant, 2006). Such indications are 
anything that would invalidate the conceptual model (e.g., the adversary did not believe a 
deception act and kept their forces in place). This starts the first main area of critique. 
The critique asks questions to see if the conceptual model can be invalidated (Bryant, 
2006). The next phase is explore, which will answer the questions by using the directed 
telescope. The directed telescope looks for specific information amongst the vast amount 
of data pouring in from the operational space (e.g., like NDM/RPD in which an expert 
knows what information to look for or, when they have little experience with it, what 
information is or could be missing) (Bryant, 2006; Van Creveld, 1985). The information 
that is found is filtered to ensure only relevant information is passed back up. The filtered 
information is then applied to updating the situational model. The following phase is 
compare. This phase compares the updated situational model to the conceptual model and 
sees if there are any incongruities (Bryant, 2006). If there are any, and there almost 
always are, then the final phase of adapt occurs. In the adapt phase the decision maker 
must choose between three choices: 
 to ignore the inconsistencies if they are deemed of low consequence (i.e., 
inconsistencies with the conceptual model that have little practical impact) 
 to alter the means by which the goals of the operation are to be achieved, 
or  
 to alter the goals themselves if the most basic assumptions of the 
conceptual model are invalidated (Bryant, 2006, p. 195).  
Figure 3 depicts the CECA Loop. 
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Figure 3.   CECA Loop (from Bryant, 2006, p. 192) 
The CECA loop is not as intuitive the OODA loop (Bryant, 2006). It is not 
intended to be. CECA is a model of an integrated command and control (C2) process for 
an operation that can be understood by the participants. As such, it is a tool for the 
decision maker to use while training with his or her staff or aides and during task group 
level operations (i.e., not small unit level). It is focused on the military but the sub-areas 
and main areas can be easily applied to a business venture or planned investment. 
CECA, OODA and all the previous models and theories have one main thing in 
common. They all fail to emphasize that without the information, none of the models and 
theories work. The models and theories assume a person will be rational and act on the 
information. Underlying everything is the context and point of view or worldview. The 
rational clause is dependent on where you are and what that culture considers rational. 
Rational to a US citizen may be an insult to a citizen of another country. Therefore, 
information is the ignition and fuel for the models and theories. 
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3. Information Operations 
Information Operations involve processes used to influence an adversary to act in 
a way that benefits friendly force objectives. As the US military has come to better 
understand the role of information in conducting military operations the definition of 
information has evolved. The current definition captures the broad nature of information 
operations as an amalgam of disciplines associated with information and influence:  
The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related 
capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, 
corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries 
while protecting our own. (JP 3-13, 2012, p. GL-3)   
This notes the necessary tie-in to on-going military operations, the many and varied ways 
influence can be spread while protecting friendly capabilities to execute IO campaigns 
and the decision making process. Information, or the lack thereof, can cause adversary or 
potential adversary decision makers to make a decision and commit to an action that 
leads to an end result that benefits, or at least does not harm, friendly operations. 
Therefore, a decision is made with some form of information. Without any information a 
decision would not need to be made because the world would be in perfect balance, no 
change would be perceived or forced on someone. 
How a decision maker and the general population view the world is based on 
information and how they see, or want to see, the world (i.e., their POV). Thus, they form 
an opinion about the world (or whatever they are considering). Take the example used by 
Walter Lippmann in his book Public Opinion: 
There is a small island in the ocean where in 1914 a few Englishmen, 
Frenchmen and Germans lived. No cable [i.e., no telegraph or telephones] 
reaches the island, and the British mail steamer comes but once in sixty 
days. In September it had not yet come, and the islanders were still talking 
about the latest newspaper which told about the approaching trial of 
Madame Caillaux for the shooting of Gaston Calmette. It was, therefore, 
with more than usual eagerness that the whole colony assembled at the 
quay on a day in mid-September to hear from the captain what the verdict 
had been. They learned that for over six weeks now those of them who 
were English and those of them who were French had been fighting in 
behalf of the sanctity of treaties against those of them who were German. 
For six strange weeks they had acted as if they were friends, when if in 
fact they were enemies. (Lippmann, 1922, p. 3) 
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The island population had only one way to get information, the mail steamer, and 
did not know that World War I had begun. The inhabitants had been making decisions 
based on old information and with the certainty that the world was as it had been, as they 
had seen it and in their opinion, for the past four or five decades, peaceful (Lippmann, 
1922). This is a simple example of why information is important and how it influences a 
person’s view of the world, that is, their POV or pseudo-environment (PE). It is from this 
POV or PE, which has been influenced by information, that decision makers make 
decisions (e.g., when using EVT/EUT, who decides the value or utility of an object?  The 
person viewing it. Or when using NDM/RPD/OODA it is how the expert, based on 
experience, views a situation different from a person who has little or no knowledge of 
the situation) (Lippmann, 1922; Edwards, 2009; Zsambok, 1997; Markman & Medin, 
2002; Bryant, 2006). But how does a person begin to understand the opinion of another?  
And how does that understanding help to influence a decision maker? 
Understanding another person’s opinion begins with understanding how that 
opinion was reached. That opinion was born from “the triangular relationship between 
the scene of action, the human picture of that scene, and the human response to that 
picture working itself out upon the scene of action” (Lippmann, 1922, p. 11). Simply put, 
an opinion is the resultant conflation of information (e.g., an alarm saying the ship is in 
shallow water), the interpretation of that information (e.g., the alarm tolerances are set 
too high), the decision makers’ reaction to the information (e.g., the ship is in safe water) 
and how the view of the situation is changed by the decision makers reaction to the 
information (e.g., ignore the alarm because the decision maker is not concerned by it). 
Thus, the captain holds the opinion the ship is fine where it is and does not need to make 
a course change.  
Knowing how a decision maker forms an opinion will create avenues of 
exploitation to influence, corrupt, disrupt and usurp the information that drives the 
decision making process. For example, many consider the most successful IO campaign 
in modern history to be Operation Bodyguard. Operation Bodyguard was the deception 
campaign designed to keep Hitler guessing as to the actual time and location of the 
pending Allied invasion of northern France (Breuer, 1993).  
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The Allies had agreed to open a second front in Europe to alleviate pressure on 
the Soviet Union from Nazi Germany (first in 1942, then postponed to 1943 and finally in 
1944). The second front would open up in France after a cross channel invasion (Breuer, 
1993). The invasion site was kept a secret even from Stalin until the very last moment 
(due to the fear Stalin might use that information to negotiate a peace with Hitler). The 
Allies knew that Hitler, and Hitler alone, made all military and political decisions. They 
knew they could use his biases, beliefs and myopic view of things (and those he 
surrounded himself with) to keep the invasion sites a secret until Allied soldiers hit the 
beach.  
The Allies used many tactics and techniques to influence and keep the Fuehrer 
and the Third Reich’s multiple information and intelligence gathering arms guessing. 
Tactics and techniques such as having reconnaissance craft fly more missions over an 
area, the Pas de Calais, than over others. The Nazis picked up on this and reported it back 
to Hitler. The extra over flights simply reinforced (i.e., influenced) his opinion that the 
Allies would invade France via the Pas de Calais region, as had been done throughout 
history due the short distance between England and France at that point (about 20 miles). 
The Allies also identified German spies in England and either turned them into double 
agents or executed them (i.e., disrupt and corrupt the information gather and reporting 
process). These double agents, the so called First String Violins, fed the Nazis 
intelligence and information that confirmed what the Allies were already doing or had 
plans to do (i.e., usurping the information reaching Hitler). The information they sent was 
enough to convince the Nazi intelligence services that the received information was 
accurate and actionable (e.g., the First Strings would send an urgent communication 
saying the Allied High Command had just placed General Patton in charge of a newly 
formed army and the next day newspapers in England would run the same information. 
Thus, their credibility was established, maintained and increased.). They influenced 
Hitler and his inner circle into believing and focusing on the Pas de Calais region as the 
invasion site. This became evident when Hitler refused to release the Panzer divisions 
stationed around Pas de Calais to repel the landings at Normandy (i.e., behavior that 
favored the Allies).  
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The IO campaign was a resounding success. It succeeded because the Allies knew 
how Hitler reached his opinions and decisions, and what they were. They used that 
information and developed a plan (using many if not all the models and theories known at 
that time) that integrated IO into the ongoing operations influencing Hitler and the 
German High Command into believing the invasion would come through the Pas de 
Calais region of France.  
C. CONCLUSION 
No one model or theory will explain or predict what or how a decision maker 
chooses an option. Research and theory has identified some of the systematic regularities 
within decision-making (Leboeuf & Shafir, 2005). However, it is still difficult to describe 
and predict the choices that need to be made and to make decisions. Many of the 
proposed decision theories and models were developed in laboratory settings and failed to 
incorporate the real world or context of a situation. Only within the last couple of decades 
has the context of a situation been considered. NDM/RPD, and OODA/CECA all 
incorporate information received from the context of a situation or the environment in 
which the situation is playing out. 
The context of a situation and the environment are important as they provide the 
decision maker with information about the situation that could help the decision maker to 
have a full understanding or picture of the situation, thereby helping to establish an 
accurate PE and mental model. Decisions are not made in a vacuum. A decision maker 
has to understand the environment in which the decision is to be made. For example, a 
Sailor might overhear the CO ordering the Navigator to break out charts of Africa and 
believe the ship will soon be headed there. The Sailor tells his shipmates to prepare for a 
deployment to Africa. But the ship is not deploying to Africa. The CO is preparing for 
officer training and the sailor took his order out of context. Thus, the picture (i.e., the 
information) the Sailor developed was wrong. Similarly, information received from the 
environment or PE impacts a decision in many ways such as by confirming what was 
expected (deploying to Africa), only partially confirming what was expected (deploying 
but not to Africa) or by providing disconfirming information (not moving off the pier). 
Thus, the information received from the context or environment enhances the decision 
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maker’s understanding (e.g., confirming or contradicting) of the situation and a decision 
can be reached on how to act.  
The act caused by manipulating the information, information environment and the 
decision making process to execute a decision(s) that favor the United States and her 
Allies is the end state of an IO campaign. How is the information manipulated?  What are 
the tactics?  What avenues can be used for influence in an IO campaign?  Which 
information needs to be provided (and decisions influenced) and at what level (i.e., 
national, state, or local)?  These are some of the questions to consider when planning an 
IO campaign. This thesis will provide some of the answers in the next section, 




























III. INFLUENCE-MANIPULATING THE INFORMATION 
The models and theories discussed in the last section depict the process of 
decision-making, what a decision may require to complete the process and in what order 
the process needs to be completed. If the process of making the decision is understood, 
ways to manipulate the information used by the decision-maker and the process can be 
planned for and executed. Information can be manipulated in a manner favorable to 
transmitting a message that would influence a target. Influence can be used in the 
physical, cognitive and informational dimensions of the information environment (JP 3-
13, 2012). This thesis proposes that the same dimensions that are characteristic of the 
information environment also characterize the information within that environment. All 
three dimensions have different features that can be used to exploit or defend the 
information. Figure 4 depicts the information environment. 
 
Figure 4.   The Three Dimensions (from JP 3-13, 2012, p. I-2) 
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A. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT   
The three dimensions are completely interactive with each other but have been 
separated into the three dimensions because the preponderance of evidence places a piece 
of equipment, an action, or information more in one area than another (as shown in 
Figure 4). In brief, the physical dimension moves the information; the informational 
dimension gathers the data and interacts with the physical to display the data; and finally, 
the cognitive dimension interprets the data gathered in the informational dimension and 
displayed in the physical dimension. This is a continuous cycle feeding the demand for 
information.  
1.  Physical Dimension 
The physical dimension of information encompasses two broad areas, functional 
and economic. The functional area moves and displays the information and, as such, is 
the conduit for information (i.e., voice communications, email, reports). It displays the 
information in the form of symbols (i.e., letters and words), indicators (i.e., a symbol 
representing a known friendly contact or an unknown, assumed hostile contact on an 
Aegis display), and pictures or video. The display represents the information being 
inputted and received from the informational and cognitive dimensions. This display 
provides a decision maker with a manageable representation of the scene of action, that 
is, the information the decision maker is seeking.  
The economic area is the price tag and business aspect of intelligence (e.g., the 
company who builds the satellites, the cellular phones, and cameras). The economic area 
is the most identifiable area when a decision maker is speaking about intelligence and 
information. This area has all tangible equipment, parts and infrastructure normally 
associated with communications (e.g., transmission and reception), command and 
control, wires, and the mediums they are placed in (e.g., sea, air, land, and space) (JP 3-
13, 2012). Thus, it is the easiest to quantify and measure. It provides the necessary tools 
to use effectively employ sensors (i.e., NDM/RPD, and OODA/CECA) to find the 
wanted information or just to observe an adversary and see what indicators, if any, they 
give off (e.g., massing troops and supplies on a border) (Bryant, 2006; Van Creveld, 
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1985). The economic area uses the original economic version of EVT/EUT to place a 
price tag on all the tools, parts, infrastructure, maintenance, and everything else 
associated with it (Edwards, 2009; Evans, Over, & Manktelow, 2008). The system or 
equipment that is best suited for a task and has the best price is bought and used.  
The physical dimension connects the informational with the cognitive dimension 
by displaying, moving, and sharing the information (i.e., the functional area) (JP 3-13, 
2012). It is in the physical dimension that information goes from specific to general. As 
information is passed between users the decision maker at each level receives the 
information, cognitively filters it and passes the information along. This results in the 
physical truncation and generalization of information. Thus, a top decision maker 
receives intelligence that is distilled into the most important information based on the 
context of the situation (a new situation or an answer to an exploratory question). 
2. Cognitive Dimension 
The cognitive dimension involves thinking and processing the information 
received from the physical and informational dimensions. As such, the cognitive 
dimension may be considered the most important dimension, for both friendly and 
adversary decision makers (JP 3-13, 2012, p. I-3). A decision maker will take in the 
information from the physical and informational dimensions, simplify it through the use 
of heuristics, making the amount of information more manageable, and step through the 
decision-making process to reach a decision (e.g., EUT/EVT, NDM/RPD, or 
OODA/CECA) (Edwards, 2009; Persky, 1995; Edwards, 2009; Hollnagel, 2007; 
Zsambok, Beach & Klein, 1992; Bryant, 2006; Van Creveld, 1985). However, as the 
information progresses through this process of interpretation, analysis, comparison, and 
amalgamation, the decision maker changes it. This change, known as information 
filtering, is the result of the decision makers’ point of view (POV) or pseudo-environment 
(PE), his or her biases and beliefs, and how that information was displayed to the 
decision maker (Evans, Over, & Manktelow, 2008; Hollnagel, 2007; Simon, 1956; 
Williams, 2007; Lippmann, 1922). Additionally, information filtering applies for decision 
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makers at all levels of the decision making process from the highest national or strategic 
decision maker to the local or tactical decision maker.  
The cognitive dimension also contains information that may influence the 
decision maker. For example, a nation’s population thinks, perceives, visualizes, and, like 
the decision maker, makes decisions about an issue (JP 3-13, 2012; Lippmann, 1922; 
Lewin, 1936; Festinger, 1957; Milgram, 1974; Pratkanis & Aronson, 2001; Pratkanis, 
2007). These and many other factors are contained within the cognitive dimension. 
Although not included in the 2012 version of JP 3-13, the 2006 version offered additional 
factors such as leadership, morale, unit cohesion, emotion, state of mind, level of 
training, experience, situational awareness, as well as public opinion, perceptions, media, 
public information, and rumors that also influence this dimension (JP 3-13, 2006, p. I-2).  
3. Informational Dimension 
The informational dimension is where “information is collected, processed, 
stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected” (JP 3-13, 2012, p. I-3). As such, this 
dimension shares many characteristics with the physical dimension. The tools (e.g., 
computers, satellites, or email) from the physical dimension are utilized in the 
informational dimension. However, information is a separate entity in the informational 
dimension. The informational dimension contains the content and flow of information. 
The computers can, based on their programming, make decisions, analyze the data, and 
recommend courses of action to the decision maker. The informational dimension must 
be protected because if friendly forces or nations cannot send or receive information, then 
a decision will not be reached or the process will never begin. The three dimensions 
illustrate how information is processed, used and potentially altered.  
While information can be manipulated in all three dimensions, the dimension of 
ultimate interest is the cognitive dimension. The cognitive dimension controls decision-
making by amalgamating the information received from the physical and informational 




 how the decision-maker sees the situation 
 how that picture is developed 
 public opinion about the situation 
 what is found in the picture; and  
 psychological life space.  
Each potential way of influencing the cognitive dimension will be discussed 
below. 
B. THE DECISION MAKING PICTURE 
1. How the World is Seen 
One way to influence the decision maker is to identify the scene of action and 
manipulate what the decision maker sees, wants to see or is told about (if not at the scene) 
(Lippmann, 1922; Zsambok & Klein, 1997; Zsambok, Beach, & Klein, 1992; Bryant, 
2006). Lippmann stated: “whatever we believe to be a true picture, we treat it as if it were 
the environment itself” (Lippmann, 1922, p. 4). Therefore, the first information a 
decision maker receives plants a picture of what is happening or going to happen in his or 
her mind whether it is an accurate representation of the situation or the antipode of it 
(Lippmann, 1922; Zsambok & Klein, 1997; Zsambok, Beach, & Klein, 1992).  
Like the POV/PE mentioned earlier, that first picture or mental model is the 
anchor used to start the decision process. This anchor is based on information that has 
been filtered through the experiences, biases and beliefs of the decision maker and the 
aides or experts that passed the information to the decision maker. Then the decision 
maker adjusts that picture based on new filtered information (Williams, 2007). Decision 
makers “believe absolutely…not what is, but what is supposed to be the fact” (Lippmann, 
1922, p. 5; Hastie & Pennington, 2000). A decision maker holds to this picture because 
the information has been filtered through their biases and beliefs (i.e., they convince 
themselves it is true or accurate). Another decision maker may view it differently because 
the information has been filtered differently. Consequently, a decision maker may be 
blinded or give little weight to any information that is contradictory or not in line with the 
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picture they see in their heads (especially if they associate the picture with one of their 
routines, see routine effect seven on Table 1) (Betsch, Haberstroh, & Höhle, 2002).  
It is this filtered view of the scene that serves as the basis for making a decision. 
The decision made has consequences in the real world and not in the PE or picture used 
to reach the decision.  
In defense of friendly decision making, a decision maker should recognize how a 
picture develops and what s/he needs to do to control that picture in order to keep it 
accurate (i.e., keep it as influence free as possible), and prevent it from becoming too 
skewed from the actual scene. This is accomplished by understanding what and how the 
picture develops, and by recognizing that information is filtered through biases and 
beliefs. Then a decision maker can be aware of information that may be contradictory but 
important to how the decision maker wants the picture to be (e.g., accurate or skewed). 
2. Mechanics of the Picture 
In order for a decision maker to understand picture development s/he must 
recognize the triangular relationship between the scene, the picture of the scene, and the 
reaction working out on the scene (Lippmann, 1922). Once known, the picture can be 
managed, changed, and influenced to maintain accuracy or present any picture a decision 
maker wishes. Every human being sees something and forms a picture to make it easier to 
manage. However, the picture changes due to their response to the scene based on filtered 
information and the consequences of their behavior towards the scene (Evans, Over, & 
Manktelow, 2008; Hollnagel, 2007; Simon, 1956; Williams, 2007; Zsambok, Beach & 
Klein, 1992; Bryant, 2006). A decision maker needs to understand this to control or 
mitigate the triangular relationship (i.e., censor the information). This enables the 
decision maker to respond to possible reactions from the population or other decision 
makers whose behavior is based on scant information and the belief, or the will to 
believe, that some action they disagree or disapprove of is happening.  
The altered reality that decision makers and people can and will hold true results 
from the relationship between the scene, the human picture, the response to the scene, the 
casual fact, the will to believe and human imagination. Decisions are made on what 
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decision makers see in their heads, not on information they gathered themselves 
(Lippmann, 1922). This can exacerbate or temper a situation. This is eminently true in 
conflict (political or military) when both sides feel they are in the right and justified in 
defending themselves. 
3. Public Opinion 
Public opinion encompasses different attributes depending on the level of interest 
(i.e., individual, group, local, or national).  
The pictures inside the heads of these human beings, the pictures of 
themselves, of others, of their needs, purposes, and relationship, are their 
public opinion. Those pictures which are acted upon by groups of people, 
or by individual acting in the name of groups, are Public Opinion with 
capital letters. (Lippmann, 1922, p. 18)  
This distinction is made because decision makers and people will hold different pictures 
based on what interest group they are acting on or looking at (i.e., their POV). This is 
important for political decision makers (or any decision maker that depends on popular 
support) who have to pander to the various voting blocs to be elected and re-elected. 
Politicians have to respond to individual and group needs on both a local and national 
level, so knowing what their opinions are is necessary. Knowledge of public opinion is 
also necessary for military leaders.  
Military decision makers and leaders need to concern themselves with public 
opinion because rumors, innuendo and false information may destroy the morale of a 
unit. A Sailor does not vote for who should be the CO or XO, but if the CO and XO 
decide to enact a bad or unpopular policy, the Sailors will minimally comply with it and 
incessantly complain about it (i.e., their behavior will reflect their opinion that the policy 
is bad or unpopular). This will filter up to the CO and XO (i.e., inform them), at which 
point they will have to deal with the policy. “Public opinion deals with indirect, unseen, 
and puzzling facts, and there is nothing obvious about them” (Lippmann, 1922, p. 17). 
Again, knowing how public opinion is formed will help a decision maker, regardless of 
the level, manage and mitigate the rumors and bad information. This should help to keep 
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the Sailor’s perception of the environment (PE) as accurate as possible. Thus, the picture 
of the situation that develops is also as accurate as possible. 
The public forms a picture in their heads the same way a decision maker does. 
Knowledge of what is in or goes in the picture allows the decision maker to manage or 
mitigate the public opinion. 
4. In the Picture 
The decision maker develops a picture of the situation; however, the shape of that 
picture will be affected by the decision maker’s perception of the environment. This is 
true for each individual decision maker viewing the picture as each PE is equally 
different. What, then, is the PE?  Lippmann states the PE is “a hybrid compound of 
‘human nature’ and ‘conditions’” (Lippmann, 1922, p. 16). But Lippmann leaves it at that 
and lets the reader decide what human nature and conditions mean. Kurt Lewin picked up 
the discussion of the PE and tried to illuminate what he thought should be a part of it. He 
described a decision maker’s PE as a psychological life space (Lewin, 1936). Then he 
considered what should go in this psychological life space. That is, what makes up the 
picture? 
The psychological life space encompasses all information known to the decision 
maker, relevant or not. A decision maker’s entire life up to that point goes into the design 
of the picture, into the PE. The vast majority of the information will be in the fuzzy, gray, 
indistinguishable background and margins of the picture, but it is still there. “One can 
represent a life space in a continuous progression and take into account all necessary 
dynamic facts, whether they are determined directly or indirectly” (Lewin, 1936, p. 21). 
This would include the previous training a decision maker has received like schooling or 
life experiences such as graduating college or passing a professional qualification board. 
Anything that has been cared about (i.e., people, places, things, ideas) will influence how 
the picture develops or is interpreted, even if it is just in the background. Thus, “one must 
consider the whole situation as the total of what has effect for the individual under 
consideration. What is real is what has effects” (Lewin, 1936, p. 19). The real 
information will be in the foreground of the picture. This can be new information about 
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the scene that changes the situation or a moment that imposes itself on the developing 
picture. 
A moment during a lifetime is easily understood. Some moments are defining 
such as getting married or taking command of ship; others are not so definitive such as 
getting reprimanded by the captain. These moments can be quick and volatile, long and 
boring or any other combination, but they come and they go. All the while, a person has 
their life in the background. Information is combined to change the background slightly. 
A decision maker sees the moments as the object in focus, or in the foreground, of the 
mental picture being used or one that had been used (i.e., a memory or template). Thus, 
each situation informs the other and is intimately connected to it. The moment influenced 
the life space that had caused it (Lewin, 1936). These are interwoven with each other and 
help to define the picture that is seen. Interest must then turn to discovering the 
phenomena that interact to create an individuals’ life space.  
5. Facts of the Psychological Life Space 
At first glance a person would be tempted to answer this question by saying all 
known information, just as with the picture, form the facts of the psychological life space. 
However, all known information cannot be considered by an individual due to the sheer 
amount of data that would have to be considered every time a decision had to be made 
(even using heuristics) (Lewin, 1936). Further, a new situation with new information 
would force the entire decision making process to start over just so the new information 
could be weighed against or applied to the known information. Facts that get included are 
those that are real. But how can something be determined to be real?  A fact is real when 
it affects a person at that moment. People are not affected by every action that happens 
around them. Therefore, facts may be quasi-physical, quasi-social, and/or quasi-
conceptual. For example, an event happening 100 feet away from a person is not real to 
that person if they are unaffected by it. This is, as Lewin called it, a “quasi-physical fact” 
(Lewin, 1936, p. 24). The facts are called quasi-physical because the environment outside 
a decision makers head is physically there but the knowledge that it is there has to be 
recognized and acknowledged by that decision maker. Then it is filtered by the decision 
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maker and added to the picture of the current moment. Consequently, the same room can 
look completely different to different people (e.g., a Chief and the XO), even if they are 
in it at the same time. That same room can appear different for the Chief depending on 
his how he feels, his mood, or his goals (Lewin, 1936). The condition the Chief is in 
shifts the focus of his or her picture or brings to the foreground something that skews the 
accuracy of the picture. That could be hunger pangs, the knowledge of a task that has yet 
to be completed or some other bit of information that pushes itself into the spotlight of 
the scene. The Chief, with a skewed picture, may order (i.e., decide on how to behave) 
his Sailors to clean the room in order to have it meet the intended picture or template of 
cleanliness and organization. 
Why does the Sailor comply with the Chief’s orders?  For people who work 
outside the military, why do they obey laws?  The answer to both questions  lies in the 
psychological life space of seeing themselves as a member of the military or as law-
abiding citizens who believe that is how they should act (see source credibility below for 
a review of the granfalloon, social norm, or social modeling)  (Lewin, 1936; Pratkanis, 
2007; Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007). Again, the facts are in relation to the person and how 
that person is affected. People choose a social relationship, making it part of who they are 
and believing they should behave in a certain way because that is how they see a member 
of that group behaving. This belief in “normative group behavior may be more important 
than the legal or social definition of group membership” (Lewin, 1936, p. 25, Pratkanis, 
2007; Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007). These chosen social relationships are called quasi-
social facts and like the quasi-physical facts, will be retained in the psychological life 
space (Lewin, 1936).  
This thought process is often true for anyone who views themselves as being part 
of a group. They identify with the group, adopt the values and views of that group, and 
begin to see the world through the filter of the group’s influence and the group’s structure 
(i.e., their social identity). The structure is plainly seen when people identify themselves 
as liberal, conservative, democrat or republican. Identifying yourself as such leads a 
person to view the world in that way and make decisions based on that group view or, at 
least, give more weight to the views that reflect the group’s values and norms. These 
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facts form the quasi-conceptual facts of a person’s psychological life space. Group 
association is usually tied to a person’s profession or something s/he is passionate about. 
That means if s/he wants to progress in his or her career and move up the pay scale, s/he 
has to work within the structure of a job to gain experience, knowledge and recognition 
of abilities (Lewin, 1936). Therefore, “the individual concerned must adapt if he wants to 
attain certain goals” (Lewin, 1936, p. 26). The military is a good example because a 
person has to adjust and adapt to the military lifestyle; otherwise, they can be discharged 
for failing to adapt. 
One can see how the various facts can skew a scene one way or another. But these 
facts are not as distinctly separate as one may think. The psychological life space is 
conflated with these facts. Some situations are easily placed in one of the three domains 
(quasi-physical, quasi-social, quasi-conceptual) but the vast majority cannot be. The 
domains help to filter and inform the picture that develops in the mind of a decision 
maker. Knowing this will help a decision maker ask the right questions to be the most 
informed or seek supporting and contradicting information in order to have the most 
accurate picture possible before making a decision.  
The facts and information that reach the final decision maker are applied to the 
initial picture of the scene. What happens if that initial scene changes?  How does the 
scene change and how is that change recognized?  The scene can, as Lewin says, 
influence the picture in two ways. 
One can roughly distinguish two cases in which the life space is 
influenced from the outside: (1) The influence can occur by way of 
perceptual process, usually leading to a change of the cognitive structure 
of the field with reference to the object in question. (2) The influence can 
be a gross somatic one. A stone may hit a person and cause injury or loss 
of consciousness. This stone need not necessarily appear in the perceptual 
field of the person. (Lewin, 1936, p. 27)  
This means the scene on which a picture is based can change due to an internal 
cognitive choice based on perception or an outside force. Both are new information from 
the outside environment about the scene, but one is perceived and the other is, essentially, 
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forced. Understanding what goes into a decision and how multiple decisions interact 
could make it easier to reach a decision. This requires an understanding of:  
(a) how the world is viewed by himself and others 
(b) how the picture develops 
(c) how the development of that picture leads to public opinion 
(d) why a decision maker must concern themselves with public opinion at the 
level that affects him or her 
(e) what goes into a picture 
(f) the psychological facts that underlay everything.  
Knowing all this helps the decision maker make a better decision utilizing the theories 
and models described earlier. Furthermore, this understanding gives the decision maker 
and his or her organization the ability to nimbly respond to changes in and challenges to 
the picture used to make decisions (e.g., the process of OODA/CECA). These changes 
and challenges could be the efforts and results of adversarial IO and strategic 
communication (SC) campaigns such as adversarial propaganda. A large part of 
propaganda is spreading rumors, half-truths and outright lies. During WWII the 
forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS), produced a guide or handbook on successful rumor building and spreading. It 
builds and capitalizes on many of the parts mentioned above [(a)–(f)]. 
C. INFLUENCE TECHNIQUES  
1. Rumors-A Corrosive Force 
A decision maker has to deal with rumors because of the effect it can have on the 
mission, military, populous and government. Rumors can affect people by “first, creating 
and increasing fear, anxiety, confusion, over-confidence, distrust and panic. Second, by 
forcing the release of enemy information and encouraging impotent enemy action.” 
(OSS, 1943)  These effects directly affect (a)–(f) above  
A rumor is a believable but unverifiable story with the following characteristics: 
 it is easy to remember 
 has a stereotypical plot that follows the traditions of the target group 
 it is of interest to the target group; and  
 exploits the emotions and sentiments of the target group (OSS, 1943).  
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Rumors create problems for a decision maker, forcing him or her to spend time and 
money on combating or debunking the rumors. That, in turn, means the decision maker is 
not devoting as much cognitive power to the conflict or war as s/he could be and gives an 
advantage to the adversary. A successful rumor will, therefore, have the ability to affect 
five of the dimensions of decision making: (a) how the world is viewed by himself and 
others, (b) how the picture develops, (c) how the development of that picture leads to 
public opinion, (e) what goes into a picture and (f) the psychological facts that underlay 
everything.  
Tailoring a rumor ensures its ability to spread, exponentially affecting more 
people, and requiring more answers or expenditure of resources by the decision maker or 
government to refute the rumor. This requires the person crafting the rumor to have 
knowledge and intelligence on the target audience (JP 3-13, 2012; OSS, 1943). If the 
audience was the people of a nation, the intelligence necessary for crafting a rumor could 
be their traditions and folklore [(a)], willingness to support the decision maker [(c)], or 
level of privation they are willing to accept [(c) and (f)].  
This information on the target audience helps to guide and tailor a rumor to 
increase its efficacy and alter the picture and scene the decision maker develops in their 
minds. During WWII “the creation of a successful propaganda rumor is more an 
accomplishment of art than of science” (OSS, 1943). Since that time many new theories, 
models and influence tactics such as valence framing, social norms, vivid appeals, and 
effort justification have been proposed and identified. Additionally, researchers have also 
made progress in identifying and verifying the building blocks of effective 
communication and influence. 
2. The Techniques of Influence  
Aristotle in his book Rhetoric presents “three facets to effective communication: 
ethos (good character), logos (an effective message), and pathos (control of the 
emotions)” (Pratkanis, 2007, p. 18). Building on Aristotle the researchers added one more 
characteristic or technique, landscaping or pre-persuasion, and updated the meanings. 
Aristotle was aware of pre-persuasion but did not consider it a characteristic of effective 
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communication. The original three characteristics were updated to become: “create a 
relationship with the audience (source credibility), present the message in a convincing 
fashion, and use emotions to persuade” (Pratkanis, 2007, p. 19). Including pre-
persuasion, these four base characteristics are the foundation for many tactics used in IO, 
SC, and advertising campaigns.  
The techniques of influence can be used in each dimension of the information 
environment (cognitive, physical, and informational). They all deliver information to the 
decision maker in different ways and have different strengths and weaknesses with 
advantages and disadvantages. The techniques, tactics, dimensions of information, 
picture development and the decision maker’s response to them correspond to the 
cognitive response law of influence (Greenwald, 1968; Pratkanis & Aronson, 2001; & 
Pratkanis, 2007). The law states: 
The successful persuasion tactic is one that directs and channels thoughts 
so that the target thinks in the manner agreeable to the communicator’s 
point of view; the successful tactic disrupts negative thoughts and 
promotes positive thoughts about the proposed course of action. 
(Pratkanis, 2007, pp. 19–20)  
Thus, initial or new information changes the scene or picture in a way that convinces an 
adversarial decision maker to behave in a manner that is favorable to a friendly desired 
end state.  
The four foundation blocks that form the techniques of influence are defined as 
the following. Landscaping or pre-persuasion (atechnoi to Aristotle) is creating or setting 
a scene such that the target decision maker or audience is more inclined to listen to the 
message and act in accordance with it. Source credibility (ethos) is: “the establishment of 
a social relationship that facilitates influence between the source and target of influence” 
(Pratkanis, 2007, p. 30). The effective message (logos) is one that induces the target 
decision maker or audience to focus on what the communicator wants them to. Emotional 
tactics (pathos) are those that use emotion as a vehicle to influence a decision maker and 
audience.  
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Tactics have been developed through the years to leverage the techniques of 
influence. These tactics can be used to influence a decision maker or target audience. 
Many of the tactics have been in use and known for many decades but few have been 
empirically tested. This lack of testing led researchers to speculate as to   which tactics 
belonged to which foundational areas. Researchers recognized this problem and have 
since scientifically tested and classified over 100 tactics of influence (Pratkanis, 2007). 
Some of the tactics can work in more than one area but the preponderance of evidence 
places them in one area. The following are a brief review of a select few tactics, 
organized within each of the foundational blocks4. 
a. Landscaping 
Landscaping or pre-persuasion seeks to set the stage for persuasion. That could be 
anything from buying a bar of soap to moving forces to another area of the battlefield, 
weakening part of the front. Landscaping attempts to “control the cognitive (e.g., 
perceptions of issues, options, etc.) and social (e.g., the process of decision-making) 
structures used to reach your opinion or decision” (Pratkanis, 2007, p. 21). The following 
tactics can be readily viewed in product advertisements and political ads, but they can 
also be easily used during an IO campaign: (1) define and label an issue in a favorable 
manner, (2) valence framing, (3) control the flow of information, and (4) control the 
procedures for making a decision.  
(1) Decision makers will view the same situation or picture differently based on 
how it is labeled, especially if the decision maker is not at the scene of action. Labeling 
an issue is pushing initial information out through a pre-selected filter. The information 
comes out already colored and viewed in a certain way based on how it is labeled. This 
directs a decision maker or target audience to think about that issue in the way the 
influence agent wants them to, which then leads to possible compliance with the 
influence attempt.  
(2) Valence framing portrays an issue in a positive or negative light (Pratkanis, 
2007). The classic demonstration of this is the Asian disease problem developed in 1981 
                                                 
4 For a full review of the tactics see The Science of Social Influence edited by Anthony Pratkanis. 
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by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1981). For this demonstration, Tversky and 
Kahneman formed two groups of participants and asked them to imagine an outbreak of a 
disease during which it was estimated that 600 people will die. The first group was given 
two options: Program A will save 200 people while Program B gives a 1/3 probability 
that all 600 will be saved and a 2/3 probability no one will be saved. The second group 
was given two different program choices. Program C said 400 people would die while 
Program D gave a 1/3 probability that no one would die and a 2/3 probability that all 600 
will die. Group one participants overwhelmingly (72%) chose Program A. Interestingly, 
78% of group two chose to gamble on Program D (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Thus, 
the first group chose a certainty of saving 200 lives versus the probability of the same 
thing (1/3 of 600 is 200) and group 2 chose to gamble on a 2/3 chance of death (a 1/3 
chance of life) over a certainty of 400 killed (meaning 200 lives saved). Group one chose 
to save 200 lives and group 2 chose not to kill 400 lives, in essence saving the other 200. 
The information presented to both groups was exactly the same. The results for all 
choices are the same. The difference was how that information was presented. The 
filtering of initial information into a positive or negative light framed how the groups 
viewed the scene and informed their decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, Pratkanis, 
2007).  
(3) One of the oldest forms of influence available involves selecting what 
information is released or withheld. A decision maker would, ideally, have most or all of 
the relevant information before making a decision. But denying a decision maker all 
relevant information or hiding and/or minimizing the relevant facts in a deluge of 
irrelevant or unnecessary facts greatly hinders the decision making process. An example 
of this is the invasion of Normandy during WWII. After the landings had begun President 
Roosevelt made a broadcast to the American people (which the Nazi knew about almost 
immediately) stating “The Germans appear to expect landings elsewhere. Let them 
speculate. We are content to wait on events”-inferring a second invasion” (Breuer, 1993, 
p. 215). Thus, Hitler was denied the facts and presented with a falsehood of a second 
invasion. 
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(4)  “Control of the procedures translates into control of the outcome” (Pratkanis, 
2007, p. 28). There are many procedures for making a decision (e.g., EVT/EUT, NDM, 
and OODA). The process can be shaped by a variety of competing demands such as time, 
the type of decision (e.g., majority or unanimous), and what the decision is trying to 
accomplish (e.g., optimizing versus the 80% solution). The information is inputted into 
the process of choice. That process may only use or accept certain types or amounts of 
information. This means a decision maker will only have access to the information that 
has passed through the filter of the process and the decision will be based on that 
information, not necessarily on all the relevant information.  
Landscaping sets the stage for the persuasion. The stage now belongs to the 
communicator who delivers the message. The next step for the communicator is to 
establish a social relationship with the audience. This relationship will be the conduit for 
the influence attempt. 
b. Source Credibility 
Source credibility is an essential part of influence. The communicator has to be 
credible or the audience will, in most cases, tune them out. Researchers initially believed 
the communicator had to possess what the audience believed were good characteristics 
(i.e., good morals and good sense) (Pratkanis, 2007). But it was discovered that this was 
not necessarily true. They found “what is important for influence is the establishment of a 
social relationship that facilitates influence between the source and the target of the 
influence” (Pratkanis, 2007, p. 30). This means the communicator has to establish some 
sort of rapport with the audience such that they, the audience, believe the communicator 
to be credible source of information about the topic being discussed. Examples of tactics 
used to establish rapport are: (1) be a credible source, (2) granfalloon tactic, (3) social 
norms, and (4) social modeling. 
(1) Researchers have found there are many reasons for a communicator to be 
found persuasive. They have been roughly divided into two groups, hard and soft. A hard 
communicator has attributes such as being an expert (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953) or 
of high social status (Leftkowitz, Blake, & Mouton, 1955) while the soft communicator 
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has attributes like being attractive (Chaiken, 1979) or likeable (Cialdini, 2001) (Pratkanis, 
2007). Based on these attributes, an audience would ascribe, from their POV, a certain 
amount of weight or buy-in to what the communicator is saying. The information 
presented should be relevant to the influence attempt to have the greatest impact on the 
audience. If the information being presented by the communicator is outside their 
recognized attributes, the influence attempt will have a smaller impact on the audience.  
(2) A granfalloon is a social identity chosen by an individual that is usually 
meaningless (e.g., a Buckeye, a Freemason, a Democrat) (Pratkanis, 2007). This opens up 
two readily exploitable avenues for influence. The first one tells or guides the person’s 
attitudes and beliefs, and the second is a source of self-esteem and social status (Lewin, 
1936; Pratkanis, 2007; Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007). Information received is first filtered 
through the group values and ideals before being applied to the developing picture. Once 
the group values are applied, a course of action is chosen and compared to what the group 
believes is acceptable. This behavior, the social norm of the group, defines the decision 
maker as part of that group.  
(3) Social norms are the rules that guide behavior and attitudes in a situation. 
Norms are broken into descriptive and injunctive (e.g., quasi-social facts); that is, what 
most people do and what should be done (Lewin, 1936; Pratkanis, 2007, Goldstein & 
Cialdini, 2007). Social norms are the filter that serves as a measuring stick or reference 
that a decision maker uses for making decisions or holding an attitude.  
(4) Social modeling is acting in the same manner as the communicator. Often the 
communicator is paid for his/her endorsement of the behavior being modeled. A person 
of high status will be seen working in a soup kitchen or at a battered woman’s shelter. 
Therefore, audience members may want to copy them because the communicator is a 
person they want to be like (Pratkanis, 2007; Bryan & Test, 1967). The information 
displayed is social modeling injunctive and provides an example of how to act if the 
audience believes the act is representative of their values.  
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The communicator has established source credibility. Now he must deliver the 
message to influence the audience. However, the message must be delivered effectively 
in order to be received positively. 
c. Effective Message 
The message is the heart of an influence attempt. Everything else is operating in 
support of the message. Without an effective message, anything else that has been or will 
be done is likely to be in vain. The message should focus the audience on what the 
communicator wants them to think (Pratkanis, 2007). Then the communicator can give 
reasons to do something or have the audience provide the good reasons why they should 
comply with the influence attempt. Some tactics that can be used are: (1) self-generated 
persuasion, (2) message fit, (3) vivid appeals, and (4) repetition of a message. 
(1) Self-generated persuasion is one of the most effective forms of influence 
because it results in a steadfast change in attitude (Boninger, Brock, Cook, Gruder, & 
Romer, 1990; Miller & Wozniak, 2001; Watts, 1967; Pratkanis, 2007). The persistence of 
the attitude change is the result of the influence target being asked to come up with 
reasons for behaving in accordance with the influence. The audience takes the 
information, filters it through personal values and applies it to their picture, ensuring it is 
displayed in a positive and beneficial light. Thus, people convince themselves that the 
new behavior is best one for the reasons they developed. 
(2) A second way to develop an effective message is to play to your audiences’ 
biases. When the message from the influence agent draws on the belief system of the 
audience, the message is more likely to be received (Pratkanis, 2007). The belief system 
of the audience may be how they see themselves (e.g., the granfalloon, religious, social 
norm), a stereotype, a pre-existing belief, or a shared experience. An influence agent 
provides information that is similar to or reinforces a belief or experience. The audience 
links the information with the belief or experience being played on and gives that 
message more credibility than a similar message that does not link to a belief or 
experience. 
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(3) Vivid appeals are also ways to generate meaningful messages. Vivid appeals 
may be emotionally interesting and/or may agitate the audience either with the message 
or with the visual effect. In either case, the message relates to the present time or near 
future (Pratkanis, 2007). The communicator paints an image for the audience that 
conveys the information and the audience personalizes because they are seeing the 
picture in their minds. Additionally, the image they see may stay with them and help 
form their opinion about a product, plan or scene. The emotion hooks the audience, the 
image is injected and changed based on how an individual emotionally responds, and 
then placed in the foreground of the scene. This happens because the audience processes 
the information through their filters making the information, if well crafted, more 
believable.  
(4) The final tactic is to repeat the message frequently. It has been demonstrated 
that the more a message is heard or seen, the more validity is given to it, even if it is a 
complete lie (Pratkanis, 2007; OSS, 1943). The information contained in the rumor or 
message will gain strength as more people receive and spread it. This happens because an 
individual will hear it from or has the rumor confirmed by a communicator they hold as 
credible. Therefore, the individual passes it on what he/she believes is credible fact. Thus, 
the rumor mutates from unconfirmed information to confirmed fact by multiple 
individuals, not actual confirmation of the facts (e.g., urban myths). 
Self-generated persuasion, ensuring that the message fits the audience, vivid 
appeals, and repetition of a message are all tactics that can be used to deliver the message 
to the audience. The audience then has to consider the message. However, the 
communicator can continue to direct the audience through appeals to their emotions. 
d. Emotional Tactics 
The message may be the heart of the influence attempt but emotion is the blood, 
hot or cold, that pumps through it. “Arouse an emotion and then offer the target a way of 
responding to that emotion that just happens to be the desired course of action” 
(Pratkanis, 2007, p. 50). For example, using fear, scare them, point to a person or object 
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and tell them by banishing that person or destroying that object they will relieve their 
fears.  
Emotional appeals work because emotions are easy to create and offer many paths 
for influence to work in. Emotional people typically do not hear or see all the facts of a 
situation. They are occupied in dealing (i.e., reducing negative feelings or continuing 
positive ones) with that emotion and are more susceptible to agree to a course of action 
that deals with that emotion (Pratkanis, 2007). Four emotion tactic examples are 
considered here: (1) fear appeal, (2) guilt sells, (3) norm of reciprocity, and (4) effort 
justification. 
(1) People do not like negative consequences (e.g., losing money). In developing 
an emotional message based in fear, a negative consequence is offered unless the 
preferred course of action is taken. Further, the audience needs to believe that the 
preferred course of action is obtainable (Leventhal, 1970; Maddux & Rogers, 1983; 
Pratkanis, 2007). Everyone has, at some point in their life, dealt with fear and has been 
given recommendations or information to conquer that fear. The information contained in 
a fear appeal has been framed in a very negative light from the POV of the audience and 
skews the scene that has developed in their heads. The communicator then provides more 
information on how to reverse or reduce that skew. If the audience believes they can 
accomplish the recommendation, they will try to. Thus, the audience conforms to the 
communicators influence attempt. 
(2) As an emotional tactic, guilt prompts a person to act in the desired manner in 
order to reduce the guilty feeling or to conform to a preferred image of self. A person 
who feels guilty is more likely to comply with an influence attempt if the behavior sought 
reduces the guilt. The behavior does not need to be associated with the action that caused 
the guilt; it just has to satisfy, from the view of the guilty party, the level of restitution or 
repair of self-image to the point before the guilty action occurred (Pratkanis, 2007). The 
feeling of guilt creates a cognitive dissonance that is painful (Festinger, 1957) and that 
pain forces the object of guilt into focus in the picture. Now the individual is focused on 
the object and will be seeking information that provides a path to move that object out of 
 56
focus. The information provided has to be relevant to the individual with the guilt in 
order to be successful. 
(3) Norm of reciprocity refers to social obligation. Someone does a favor for you 
and it is expected that you return the favor at some point (Pratkanis, 2007). People are 
more likely to be influenced to comply when they feel indebted to someone or something. 
Norm of reciprocity is the opposite side of guilt. The information pushes an object to the 
foreground of the picture but it is not painful. It carries a sense of gratitude that an action 
was done on their behalf and they now feel compelled to do something that, from the 
POV of the individual, satisfies the debt to society. They will search for information and 
be more open to influence that enables them to meet this self-imposed social obligation. 
(4) The final emotional tactic discussed, effort justification, means that the harder 
something is to attain, the more it is worth at the end relative to the amount of time and 
energy expended to attain it. Forcing someone to jump through hoops or complete a large 
amount of required work leads that person to justify why they worked so hard (Pratkanis, 
2007). Information that another person achieved the same or similar result creates 
cognitive dissonance and forces the person to value that result higher than the person who 
did not expend the same amount of time or energy (Festinger, 1957). 
3. Overcoming Resistance-Omega Strategies 
If all audiences behaved or thought as a communicator wanted them to, then there 
would be no reason to influence them. Most times the resistance is not a person saying 
“no” but a person who is ambivalent about a decision because enjoying the benefits of 
one choice means losing the benefits of the alternate choice (Pratkanis, 2007). Decision-
making processes and models are used because a decision maker is ambivalent in the 
sense that they do not know which choice is best for them or their organization. The 
ambivalence opens two possible routes, alpha and omega, for influence and persuasion to 
overcome or reduce the ambivalence. “One set of persuasion strategies attempts to 
increase the attractive features of the alternative; the second set attempts to decrease the 
negative features of the alternative” (Knowles & Riner, 2007, p. 83). These are very 
different strategies and researchers have found that when employed, a majority of the 
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time emphasizing the attractive features is often the first influence attempt used. Attempts 
at reducing the negative features were tried second and less often. Thus, they have been 
dubbed the alpha and omega approaches respectively. The approaches are widely 
recognized in psychology and have been verified by neuroscientists (Knowles & Riner, 
2007)5. Either strategy used should overcome resistance but how that is accomplished 
and at what cost differs greatly between the alpha and omega approaches. Much of the 
research in overcoming resistance has been focused on the alpha approaches. Alpha 
strategies simply overwhelm resistance without reducing it (Perloff, 2003; Knowles & 
Riner, 2007). However, omega strategies work to reduce the decision makers’ reluctance 
(Knowles & Riner, 2007). Reducing reluctance is a relatively new approach to influence. 
Recognition of the value of the omega approaches has increased and so has the research 
into it. Omega strategies represent the focus of this thesis. 
Omega strategies have proven that they reduce reluctance and ambivalence, and 
are relatively inexpensive resource-wise to implement. Reducing the reluctance and 
ambivalence makes “the decision less conflicted and more satisfying” (Knowles & Riner, 
2007, p. 106). They are inexpensive because incentives and bonuses do not need to be 
added in and an influence agent does not have to spend the time establishing extensive 
relationships with the target audience members. Time and money are saved which is good 
for the bottom line or a decision maker can make more decisions in a faster time, which 
can equal an advantage over an adversary. 
Research into resistance has identified three areas of resistance: reactance, 
skepticism, and inertia (Knowles & Riner, 2007). Reactance is a defense used when an 
individual is threatened by an influence or change attempt. Skepticism focuses on what is 
being asked (i.e., an individual does not believe the message). Inertia is a desire to keep 
the status quo; no change for any reason. Each of these types of resistance has strategies 
that can be used to overcome them. As with influence, the type of resistance (i.e., 
                                                 
5 The neurology of this process is outside the scope of this thesis, for a review of the science see DC 
Fowles 1988 article Psychophysiology and psychopathology: A Motivational Approach, in the journal 
Psychophysiology or J.A. Grays’ 1994 article Framework for a taxonomy of psychiatric disorders in the 
book Emotions: Essays on emotion theory. 
 58
reactance, skepticism, inertia) has to be known or identified before an attempt to 
overcome it is made.  
a. Reactance-Fear of Change 
Reactance is the negative emotion cause by the actual or perceived usurpation of 
freedoms. Consequently, an individual is well motivated to resist the change being forced 
upon or asked of them. How it is framed, what is asked and the alternatives available 
have little to no impact on the reactance of a person. The fact that change is being asked 
or made is enough. Two reasons have been found for this: (1) nature of the threat 
(change) and (2) the freedoms threatened. A blatant, coercive, or unwanted attempt will 
produce a strong reaction while an attempt that is subtle, indirect, or justified will have a 
weak reaction. And the more freedoms that are threatened with change and how 
important those freedoms are to the individual determines the strength of reactance to the 
influence attempt. Thus, the best way to minimize or avoid reactance is not to raise one at 
all. But reactance would be raised because a change is being asked or suggested. This 
would be unnecessary if the targeted individual or audience behaved the way you wanted 
them to. Omega strategies to reduce reactance are: (1) depersonalize the request, (2) the 
power of “yes”, and (3) providing choices (Knowles & Riner, 2007). 
(1) An influence attempt can be very personal. The communicator is asking the 
individual to do or change something. This can cause their defenses to go up. One way to 
reduce or bring down their defenses is to depersonalize the request. This is can be done in 
two ways. The first is to remove any first-person words in the message. For example, it is 
the policy of the management or all employees are required to comply with this order. 
The second way to depersonalize the request is to disguise it in the form of a story 
(Knowles & Riner, 2007). The information of the request is seen less as a personal 
judgment by the communicator and more as suggestion. The emotion is taken out of the 
request and it may be treated objectively. 
(2) Telling someone “no” decreases choices and increases reactance. This can be 
avoided by redirecting the individual with “Yes, and…” or “Yes, if…” statements. Thus, 
a person feels they still have choices and options open that are agreeable to them. This 
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should result in reduced or no reactance (Winter, Sagarin, Rhoads, Barrett, & Cialdini, 
2000; Knowles & Riner, 2007, p. 92). The information here is volleyed back and forth 
between the influencing agent and the decision maker. The decision maker receives the 
first bit of information, filters it and sends it back to the agent. The agent attempts to steer 
the decision maker by introducing new information that leads the decision maker towards 
a decision that benefits the influencing agent. 
(3) Finally, reactance can be reduced by providing choice. The power of choice 
gives the person the option of exercising their freedom. This will, in turn, channel his/her 
urge to resist and reject, and allow the person to behave in a manner desirable to the 
influence agent (Knowles & Riner, 2007). Thus, the choice is an illusion for the decision 
maker. Either “choice” made results in behavior desired by the influencing agent.  
Overcoming reactance deals with an individual’s instinctive reaction to a request 
for change that is perceived as an assault on freedom. Once a decision maker is willing to 
consider a request then what that request wants to change becomes the issue. The next 
form of resistance is skepticism about the message of the change. 
b. Skepticism-Why Change? 
Skepticism about the message of change has less to do with opposing the change 
than about the content of the message. Focusing on the message means the person is 
thinking about and processing it. Three routes for processing the message have been 
identified. In the reasoned route, the message is carefully checked against one’s personal 
beliefs and experiences for internal consistency. But not everyone thinks as deeply about 
a message. The second route is a more heuristic route using less brainpower. People give 
credibility to a message based on how or who presents it (i.e., the speaker is attractive, 
the words or phrases used are difficult to understand) (Knowles & Riner, 2007; Pratkanis, 
2007). The audience’s skepticism is reduced because of source credibility. The third route 
of processing the message is a variation of the anchor and adjustment heuristic or, as 
Duane Wegener and Richard Petty termed it, flexible correction (Wegener & Petty, 1995, 
1997; Knowles & Riner, 2007). “If the person becomes aware that his or her reactions 
toward the target are being influenced by the overlap in reactions toward the context and 
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target; the person might effortfully subtract or partial out reactions toward the context 
from reactions toward the target (i.e., “resetting” takes place)” (Wegener & Petty, 1995, 
p. 37). If a decision maker knows they are biased they will try to adjust their reasoning 
about a message to compensate for that bias (positive or negative) (Knowles & Riner, 
2007).  
Omega strategies have been developed for dealing with skepticism including: (1) 
guarantees, (2) looking ahead, and (3) change the comparison. Several others have been 
identified and studied but are ineffective or ethically challenging. Deceiving or 
distracting someone can engender feelings of being taken for a ride and cause or increase 
resistance (Knowles & Riner, 2007). Thus, an influence attempt will fail if an audience 
feels duped or lied to. 
(1) The most effective, basic, and direct omega strategy for dealing with 
skepticism is the guarantee. Since many decision makers are ambivalent towards a 
decision, the influence agent must find out what the decision maker is vacillating about 
and guarantee it not to be a problem or have a negative consequence. The object of 
ambivalence is the knowledge driving the resistance. A guarantee is the information that 
reduces that knowledge to a comfortable level so that a decision maker could behave in 
accordance with the influence attempt (Knowles & Riner, 2007).  
(2) Changing the timeframe of a request can and does influence how that request 
is processed (Trope & Lieberman, 2000; Knowles & Riner, 2007). “Distant events are 
evaluated according to objective (should it be done?), whereas immediate events are 
evaluated according to function (can it be done?)” (Knowles & Riner, 2007, p. 100). 
Thus, pushing out an event or decision gives a person more time to think about it. This 
can lower resistance because the information is not seen through a compressed frame. 
The information can then be considered more thoroughly and the best decision, as the 
decision maker views it, can be reached.  
(3) Changing the comparison can be very effective but it requires the influencing 
agent to know what is the cause or baseline of the resistance (Knowles & Riner, 2007). If 
the decision maker has their baseline information about a decision as quantity, changing 
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the price of something will have little effect. But adjusting the amount for the same price 
will have an effect. Thus, the information is reframed and repackaged for the decision 
maker’s consideration.  
Skepticism is focused on the message. The decision maker is open to the facts and 
reasons of a request. This can have positive and negative benefits. The negative side is 
that a decision maker could discover reasons to reject the proposal. However, the reverse 
may happen. While scrutinizing the proposal the decision maker could discover reasons 
to accept the proposal. This is only possible if the decision maker is a skeptic. If a 
decision maker is only interested in keeping things the same, then the status quo is the 
cause of resistance. 
c. Inertia-Do Not Change 
If it is not broken, do not fix it. For a person who exhibits this type of resistance, 
the persuader must overcome inertia before starting an influence attempt. The decision 
maker does not want to change, is fine with the status quo and will not even consider a 
change. The reasons and logic behind the request have little or no bearing on the decision 
maker. It has been noted that a decision maker may acknowledge and agree with the 
reasons and logic of a request but still dismiss it (Knowles & Riner, 2007). Inertia is the 
most frustrating and hardest form of resistance to overcome because the decision maker 
is not interested in or does not want to engage in change. There are two omega strategies 
for overcoming inertia; they are: (1) disrupt inertia and (2) increase self-efficacy. 
(1) Breaking through a decision maker’s resistance inertia requires the influencing 
agent to somehow get the person involved or interested. Making an odd request or 
introducing confusion into the persuasion attempt can accomplish this (Knowles & Riner, 
2007). An odd request or introduction of confusion could induce a decision maker to seek 
new, clarifying information about the odd request or to resolve the confusion; both get 
the decision maker involved or interested. Once involved or interested the influencing 
agent can introduce the new information in order to influence the decision maker. 
(2) Fear of making a decision, of the unfamiliar, or of acting on that decision 
strengthens the desire to keep the status quo. The strategy to overcome this fear is to 
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increase the decision maker’s self-efficacy by reminding the decision maker of a time 
when they made a good decision, tried something out of their normal routine, or did 
something outside their comfort zone that had positive results. Increasing self-efficacy 
weakens or removes resistance to change. Further, increased self-efficacy provides the 
decision maker with a sense of competence and of greater confidence in him/her-self and 
personal abilities to handle change. The knowledge of past successes can adjust attitude 
towards change from fear to consideration (Knowles & Riner, 2007).  
Inertia is the hardest form of resistance to deal with due to a decision maker’s 
insistence on looking backward and interest in maintaining the status quo (Knowles & 
Riner, 2007). As with the other omega strategies, an influence agent must know the type 
of resistance in order to effectively overcome it. Otherwise, the influencing agent will be 
blindly attempting to reduce the inertia of the audience, failing miserably and possibly 
increasing resistance by confirming to the audience that things are better as the status quo 
and not the requested change.  
d. Omega Synopsis 
Influencing or resisting influence requires a person to have a foundation from 
which to act. This foundation could be considered a social norm. If a decision maker is 
from that area s/he will have firm grasp and understanding of that foundation. But what 
about an influence agent who has never been to that area (e.g., a political candidate who 
must convince people across the country to vote for him)?  The audience does not know 
him or her and s/he does not know the audience. S/he has to convince them s/he 
understands and shares their foundation.  
4. Social Norms-A Tool of Influence 
People living in the same area usually share the same POV/PE or something very 
close to the same POV/PE (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). This is because they develop norms 
they all adhere to (fully or partially). “It is now evident that social norms not only 
prompt, but also guide people’s actions” (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2003; Kerr, 1995; 
Schultz, 1999; Terry & Hogg, 2000; Turner, 1991; Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007, p. 167). 
Researchers over the last couple of decades have produced a body of knowledge and a 
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general agreement on what social norms can do (Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007). Now they 
are looking at how social norms influence decision making and when the greatest impact 
on decision making may be felt. Several theories have been put forth to describe where 
the impact could be greatest; the relevant theories are deviance regulation theory (Blanton 
& Christie, 2003), social identity and self-categorization theory (Ellemers, Spears, & 
Doosje, 2002; Terry, Hogg, & White, 2000), and the focus theory of normative conduct 
(Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991) (Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007). 
Deviance regulation theory (DRT) is defined as the prediction 
that people will try to maintain positive public and private self-images by 
choosing desirable ways to deviate from social norms and by avoiding 
undesirable ways of deviating from social norms (Blanton & Christie, 
2003, p. 115; Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007).  
Thus, a person’s social identity is derived from choosing to deviate from social norms. As 
such a person should pay more attention to these outside actions to ensure they are 
portraying themselves as they wish to be seen (i.e., their public image or persona) 
(Blanton & Christie, 2003; Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007). This means that an influence 
agent should accentuate the positive or negative aspects of the outside behavior when 
attempting to influence someone. To do this an influencing agent must know what the 
social norms are for an audience or given area. If the behavior the influence agent wants 
to push a person towards is a constructive one and is recognized as the norm then the 
agent should accentuate the negative aspects of not behaving in accordance with the norm 
(i.e., frame it in a negative light). If the behavior believed to be the norm is deleterious, 
then accentuate the positive aspects of not behaving in accordance with the norm (i.e., 
frame it in a positive light) (Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007). This allows the influence agent 
to successfully influence only after the norm is identified. Without identifying the social 
norm, any influence attempt will fail. While some seek to slightly deviate from the norm, 
others seek to greatly deviate from it to distinctly set themselves apart, providing that 
person with a sense of uniqueness (Blanton & Christie, 2003; Kim & Markus, 1999; Nail, 
MacDonald, & Levy, 2000; Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007).  
The uniqueness of the individual is paired with that individual’s identification of 
and conforming to the social norms of the valued group (e.g., family, school, sports team, 
military service) (Brewer & Roccas, 2001; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004, 2007; Pool, 
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Wood, & Leck, 1998). The valued group becomes their social identity and demonstrates 
part of the second theory, social identity/self-categorization. Social identity is defined as 
“the self-concept based on membership in a social category” (Brewer, 2003; Hogg, 2003; 
Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007). The social identity will influence the behavior and attitude 
of the person that claims membership only when that person is invested in that group 
(Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Hogg, 2003; White, Hogg, & Terry, 2002; Goldstein 
& Cialdini, 2007). Self-categorization theory goes beyond social identity theory to 
converge on the activities and influences of the categorization process (Terry, Hogg, & 
White, 2000; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Goldstein & Cialdidni, 
2007). Thus, an individual “buys into” the social norms or rules and standards of the 
group (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). The individual identifies with the group, modifies their 
behavior to be in accordance with group standards and self-categorizes by choice.  
The third theory put forth is the focus theory of normative conduct. Focus theory 
has two parts. In the first part, injunctive (what ought to be done) and descriptive (what is 
done) norms are acknowledged as having separate effects on behavior. Thus, injunctive 
informs member’s which behaviors and attitudes are and are not acceptable while 
descriptive informs the member what actions to take or avoid in a given situation 
(Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007). This shows that the injunctive and descriptive are 
processed differently. That is,  
individuals focusing on descriptive norms need not engage in elaborate 
cognitive processing of the relevant information because applying the 
heuristic rule “I should do what most others do” is based primarily on the 
simple observations of others’ situation-specific behaviors. In contrast, 
acting on information provided by injunctive norms proves a more 
cognitively demanding course because it is based on an understanding of 
the cultures moral norms-that is, what others are likely to approve. 
(Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007, p. 171-172) 
A member sees the information presented by the behavior and attitude of other 
members of the valued group in certain situations and stores that situation in memory 
(i.e., creates a mental model). That memory could contain both injunctive and descriptive 
information about the valued group social norms. Then s/he can recall that information 
when confronted by that same or similar scene (e.g., like NDM/RPD).  
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This demonstrates the second part of the theory, “a given norm is likely to affect 
behavior directly to the extent that it is focal in attention” (Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007, p. 
171). The behavior, attitude and what is expected of that member will be center stage in 
their picture and drive the resultant behavior. Accordingly, effectively influencing a 
person or group requires the knowledge of what the norms are and which norm, 
injunctive or descriptive, aligns best with the desired end state. The best use of norms, if 
it could be done, would be to use the injunctive and descriptive and align them with each 
other and the desired end state (Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007). This can be difficult because 
the information required would be large and the influence attempt is typically conducted 
under a time constraint. If the attempt takes too long in construction, then the window for 
influencing is lost. Or if the social norms change due to a change in environment, 
perceived or forced, then the information becomes useless and the influence attempt will 
fail.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Reaching the desired end state requires knowing who or where to influence. Most 
times, but not always, the decision maker who needs to be influenced is a top level 
decision maker, such as political or military leaders. Influencing them can be 
accomplished through a variety of means in the information environment, composed of 
the physical, cognitive, informational dimensions. Changing public opinion at the level of 
the valued group (e.g., local and national) of the target decision maker is one avenue but 
this is difficult without knowing that group’s social norms, values, and how they see 
themselves. Given enough time an influencing agent could reduce resistance to the 
influence as long as the specific resistance has been identified. All of the avenues to 
influence a decision maker’s decision start with information. Without the information to 
ignite and fuel decision making; knowing all the techniques of influence, how a picture 
develops, what is included in it and the process to reach a decision is useless.  
 66
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 67
IV. ANALYSIS-THEORIES, MODELS AND INFLUENCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A decision maker may use a decision model naturally, that is to say, it is a 
subconscious use of a model. However, the conscious decision to incorporate a model 
into a personal decision making process or to analyze an opponent’s decision making 
process, needs to be carefully considered. The authors of the various models/theories 
patterned the model/theory off either ideal thoughts of what should be or analyses of 
decision making in real world actions/observations. The rest of this chapter will examine 
selected models/theories to allow a comparison of the key aspects of each model/theory. 
The models/theories examined are NDM/RPD, decision making under risk, and 
OODA/CECA. 
NDM/RPD features how experts make decisions in the real world and provides a 
template for training laymen to become experts (the type of training the military stresses). 
Decision making under risk is an ideal thought model that describes identifying, 
mitigating, and avoiding unnecessary risk to stay as safe as possible while continuing to 
complete assigned missions. The OODA framework can be used in an ideal thought 
exercise or in the real world, and is used almost universally in the military from the 
senior most level down to the most junior level. Finally, CECA is a military specific 
model that represents large, complex operations used as an ideal thought exercise or in 
operational settings. 
All of the models/theories examined have things in common that a decision maker 
has to know or figure out prior to reaching a decision. I propose that these pieces of 
common information are the common criteria. They are:  
 Identification of the scene (situational awareness) 
 The desired end state (objective) 




These may seem readily apparent when thinking about a problem in a stable, 
unchanging classroom environment but history is replete with examples of decision 
makers deciding to act without knowing one or more of these three fundamental pieces of 
information. A situation must be identified accurately to address it properly. The desired 
end state has to be known in order to reach it. However, the end state and path to get 
there can and, often do, change due to new information. These common criteria are 
intertwined with each other and it is at this point that the effect of choice of decision 
making model can be found. Some models will begin the process with one or more of the 
common criteria know. However, the situation will dictate the amount of information 
known. Additionally, decision makers are influenced by the three dimensions of the 
information environment: 
 The physical dimension (who delivers it) 
 The informational dimension (the information itself and the timeliness of it) 
 The cognitive dimension (how information conflates with the model) 
The physical and information dimensions affect the models/theories in relatively similar 
ways. The cognitive dimension, where the decision is made, affects the models/theories 
differently. The similarities and differences between the models/theories will be 
considered in the following section. 
B. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES     
1. Similarities 
The physical and informational dimensions have similar affects regardless of the 
model/theory used. The principles behind the dimensional aspects are the same but the 
result might not be due to the individuality of the decision maker, his or her staff, and 
their lines of communications. The physical dimension aspect of who delivers the 
information affects the decision maker in each model/theory by increasing or decreasing 
the amount of truth the decision maker ascribes to that information. This is important 
because a decision maker can be influenced by having the right person deliver the wrong 
information or vice versa, resulting in under or over-evaluation of the information. This 
skews the rest of the process. 
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The informational dimension also has similar affects across the models/theories in 
aspects of the information itself and the timeliness of delivery. The impact of the 
information itself is recognizing and understanding the importance of that information 
thereby allowing the decision maker to reach the most beneficial decision. It is critical 
because a decision maker may have the information but not recognize it and/or not 
understand the importance. This would prevent the decision maker from reaching the 
decision that benefits them and/or they would make a decision that could possibly harm 
them. The second informational dimensional aspect of timeliness is when the decision 
maker gets the information: early, late, or not at all. The effect this has is what the 
decision maker can do with the information. If the information reaches him or her too 
early it could be ignored, overlooked, or forgotten. If the information is too late or never 
reaches the decision maker, then the information is not added to the picture or considered 
and is useless. The result of any of these is a decision made without the decision maker 
considering all the relevant information. That means any model/theory used will not 
result in the best decision possible for the decision maker. 
2. Differences 
The cognitive dimensional aspect of how the information conflates with the 
model affects the models/theories differently because the models/theories are designed to 
reach a decision differently. The decision maker or an advisor has to be trained in, or 
exposed to, the use of the model/theory. Each requires a different level of training and 
with it, a different thought process. NDM/RPD and OODA/CECA are the 
models/theories that require training in and, for the best results, prior use of the 
model/theory. This means a decision maker or aide would think about the situation in 
similar but still unique way due to their own individual experiences. For decision making 
under risk, a decision maker that has been trained to use it but has no previous experience 
with it or the situation can use risk decision making. S/he could apply their training and 
reach a quality risk decision in a reasonable time that would not harm the mission. The 
cognitive dimension demonstrates each decision maker’s individuality in the decision 
making process and that is the greatest difference in the models/theories. 
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C. LENS OF COMPARISON 
The selected models/theories will be compared through the lens of the situation, 
common criteria, and the decision maker. The situation begins the decision making 
process. The common criteria have to be answered in order to use the model/theory 
effectively. The final lens used for comparison is the decision maker because the 
individual decision maker uses each model/theory differently. 
1. Situation  
The model/theory is chosen because a new situation is encountered or expected 
that may or may not have been encountered before. The models/theories handle each 
situation differently based on whether or not it has been encountered before. In 
NDM/RPD the situation may have been encountered before, be expected, have 
similarities to a prior situation, or be totally unexpected. Some situations will be resolved 
more quickly than others. A previously encountered situation can be resolved more 
rapidly than other situations because the situation has been solved in the past and a 
mental template for how to solve the current situation has been created. The decision 
worked once and could work again. An expected situation works in much the same way 
as a previously encountered situation. However, because an expected situation has only 
been thought about the solution to an expected situation may not work. If the situation 
has not been previously encountered, but has similarities to a prior situation, mental 
models of similar encounters still serve as the template for solving the current one. 
However, in situations that are unexpected and have not been encountered in the past, no 
template exists. In this case, a decision can still be reached based on the decision maker’s 
ability to make decisions. The difference is the time it takes to reach a decision and the 
quality of that decision.  
The previously encountered or similar situation will produce faster and higher 
quality decisions than situations not previously encountered. An expected situation acts 
as a previously encountered one that has a template for being solved (but has yet to be 
proven.)  The unexpected, unfamiliar situation will take the most time to reach a decision. 
A decision reached is a short time period will not be a high quality decision but it will be 
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a decision (if one has to be made in short order.) The more time a decision maker has to 
make a decision, the higher quality it could be. 
Decision making under risk is used only for expected or previously encountered 
situations because the model is to be used prior to encountering a situation. That 
previously encountered situation serves as a template for the expected situation. In this 
model/theory, the decision maker has already analyzed the previously encountered 
situation as a part of training or through experience. Thinking about or experiencing it is 
the only way to gain proficiency in the execution of this model/theory. This means a 
decision maker can use the model/theory successfully on short notice if the decision 
maker has thought of or experienced a situation similar to the new one. Thinking through 
or dissecting the previous experience before encountering or executing it again enables 
the model/theory to work as designed. If the situation has not been thought about before 
the encounter, this model will not work. 
OODA/CECA works with any situation. These models are used to plan for an 
expected or previously encountered situation or respond to an unexpected one. If the 
situation is expected, like NDM/RPD and risk decision making, a template exists to solve 
it and the information required is known or a decision maker could recognize what is 
needed. If the situation has never been encountered or thought of, the decision maker can 
reach a decision but it will take time, much like NDM/RPD (the difference being the 
decision maker; which will be explored in the decision maker section). However, if a new 
situation occurs, OODA could be used to respond but CECA could not. OODA could be 
used because it is a simpler design that requires less information and prior planning on 
the part of the decision maker. CECA could respond to a new situation if it has been 
previously thought about and, at least, minimally planned for (i.e., if-then statements). If 
not, using CECA would take too long to go through the model and decide on a response. 
New situations can be handled using NDM/RPD, OODA, and, possibly, CECA. 
Risk decision making should not be used in response to a new situation (but could if the 
decision maker has experience with a situation similar to the new one) because it is not 
designed to do so. NDM/RPD can be used as long as the decision maker is an expert in or 
familiar with it (or has the expert/laymen near enough to use him or her effectively 
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during the process). OODA can be used in a new situation only when the decision maker 
has been trained to use it. Not using OODA properly will lead to a bad decision. CECA 
could be used for a new situation as long as the new situation occurs as an event inside a 
situation that has been planned for. This means CECA is flexible enough to respond to a 
new situation but should not be used if no prior planning was conducted. The situation 
will point the decision maker towards a model/theory that could be used to reach a 
beneficial solution. 
2. Common Criteria 
The decision maker has to answer the common criteria to reach a decision. S/he is 
affected by the common criteria because they are the first steps in using the 
models/theories that s/he uses to make a decision. Not answering one or more will 
prevent a decision from being reached or cause a poor decision to be made and negate the 
use of a decision making model/theory. NDM/RPD is very dependent on quickly 
identifying the scene in order to lay the groundwork for the rest of the mental model used 
by the decision maker. This enables him or her to begin retrieval of the mental models of 
the same or similar situations. That, in turn, sets expectations about and filters for 
information coming from the scene. Once a decision maker has that understanding s/he 
can answer the other common criteria by deciding on an end state and how best to reach 
it. If new information changes one of the common criteria the decision maker can adapt 
to the change and reach a decision. 
Decision making under risk has the advantage of answering all three common 
criteria from the beginning. The design of risk decision making requires the decision 
maker to know what the situation is, what the end state is or could be, and how to get 
there in order to identify risks and ambiguities. This information can then be used to 
further sharpen the difference between risk and ambiguity through the use of the directed 
telescope (if necessary.)  Risk decision making only works if all the common criteria are 
known before a situation occurs, which means they can be planned for. Not knowing the 
common criteria means the decision maker cannot asses the risks of a situation properly, 
potentially leading to disastrous and costly consequences. 
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OODA/CECA, like NDM/RPD, depend on the identification of the scene before 
answering the other common criteria. Contrary to NDM/RPD, the speed of identification 
is not as important. Once the scene has been identified, a decision maker can use the 
model as designed to reach a decision. If new information changes the identification of 
the scene and the other common criteria, OODA/CECA can respond and adapt to it to a 
point. OODA is far more responsive and adaptable because of the relatively small amount 
of information needed to use it. This means OODA can answer the common criteria 
quicker in order to reach a decision on which to act. CECA could respond and adapt to a 
new scene if it has been considered before happening. CECA is designed to be used in 
strategic level decisions, not necessarily the tactical ones as OODA is designed for. 
Answering the common criteria rests on the identification of the scene (situational 
awareness.)  That identification enables the rest of the common criteria to be answered. 
NDM/RPD and OODA/CECA have the capability to respond to changing and new 
information from or about the scene. Decision making under risk is very inflexible and 
slow to respond (if at all.)  If identification of the scene changes too close or while the 
situation is occurring, all decisions made are doubtful unless the original scene 
identification is similar to the actual one. If the scenes were close enough to each other, 
then some of the decisions made would still be applicable. Lastly, all the models/theories 
require the common criteria to be answered to reach a decision. Not answering one will 
slow the decision cycle down and could lead to a bad or no decision. 
3. Decision Maker  
The decision maker is a unique individual with different experiences, biases, and 
beliefs. A cabinet or council of advisors that s/he has chosen or been provided with could 
support them. This council also has experiences, biases, and beliefs that could influence 
the decision maker and the decision. The decision maker determines which model/theory 
is used through subconscious (untrained) choice, trained choice, or dependence on the 
chosen council (untrained or trained decision making). 
In NDM/RPD, the trained decision-maker has expertise and/or familiarity with 
the situation or has to have an expert in his or her cabinet to filter and interpret the 
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information. If the decision maker is not the expert and does not have access to one, use 
of NDM/RPD to reach a decision will fail.  
Risk decision-making follows the requirement for being trained in use of the 
model/theory. A decision maker can have little or no experience with the situation and 
could use this model/theory effectively since all of the common criteria have to be 
answered in the beginning. This also means a decision maker has the time to use the 
directed telescope to find information about the situation, possible risks inherent to and 
because of the situation, clarification of something as a risk or ambiguous and mitigating 
actions that could be taken. While not necessary, a decision maker familiar with the 
situation will use that model/theory more effectively and more quickly. If s/he is not 
trained in the models/theories use, s/he cannot reach a decision that accounts for and 
mitigates the risk to a situation. 
OODA/CECA is in line with training in the use of the model/theory. The decision 
maker using OODA is at the tactical level, while the decision maker using CECA is, most 
likely, at the strategic level. OODA can also be used at the strategic level but is designed 
for the tactical level. Consequently a decision maker could be more familiar with OODA 
and prefer it to CECA. This would change how the decision maker looks at a situation 
and what information is needed to reach a decision. If OODA is being used at the tactical 
level, the decision maker is probably at the scene or very close to it so as to interpret the 
information without having it pass through multiple filters or be influenced by cabinet 
members or advisors. This means s/he can reach a decision faster and implement that 
decision. If OODA is being used at the strategic level, then a decision maker is receiving 
information that has passed through multiple filters and could be or has been influenced 
by cabinet members. 
CECAwas designed to be used by the military above the tactical level. CECA has 
defined steps that are complex, have to be followed and answered in a certain order to be 
used properly. As such, certain aspects of the design need to be considered by the 
decision maker. First, the decision maker has to understand that the information is 
filtered. This means the information that s/he is receiving has been filtered by the cabinet 
and may not be the right information due to how and who filtered it. Second, the decision 
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maker has to understand how that, if s/he has been allowed to choose the cabinet, the 
physical aspect of who delivers the information will be enhanced. But if cabinet members 
have assigned by a decision maker superiors, the physical aspect will have a diminished 
effect. Both of these have to be understood by a decision maker in order to use CECA 
effectively. The decision maker does not have to be an expert or familiar with the 
situation but probably is because the situation would have to have been thought of prior 
to it happening. Thus, the decision maker and his or her cabinet could have thought 
through the situation and smoothed out the mechanics of communicating information to 
the final decision maker in a manner personalized for him or her. 
A decision maker’s use of a model/theory depends on the decision maker and his 
or her cabinet. Their collective experiences, biases, and beliefs will interpret the 
information that is presented and accept or reject the information. The cabinet supports 
the decision maker and the model/theory s/he chooses, which will be the model/theory 
s/he believes will be best to reach a decision that benefits them. 
D. ANALYSIS CONCLUSION 
The selection of one model/theory over another for incorporation should be based 
on the new or expected/known situation, the ability to answer the common criteria, and 
what process the decision maker uses to reach decisions. With this in mind a decision 
maker first has to understand how s/he processes information and builds a mental model 
based on information that may or may not have been filtered before reaching the decision 
maker. Then, a decision maker can handle or learn to handle situations, and what 
questions they need to ask and/or who to ask to get information that answers the common 
criteria. Education in decision-making models and theories can add to the expertise of the 
decision maker. In this way, the decision maker can use the various models/theories to 





Tables 2–4 show how information affects the model/theory based on the situation, 
common criteria and decision maker. The information that a situation is new or 
expected/known will drive how much of the common criteria needs to be answered, and 
what information the decision maker requires to successfully reach a decision using a 
model/theory. It further lists reasons to use or not use a models/theory for a given 
situation, when to use it, and the most likely reasons a bad decision or no decision was 
made. The tables further demonstrate that the common criteria have to be answered 
before reaching a decision, a decision maker can begin a decision making process by 
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Table 4.   Observe-Orient-Decide-Act/Critique-Explore-Compare-Adapt (OODA/CECA) 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis explored the differences in the theories/models of decision making and 
the role of information in influencing decision making. The review of relevant models 
and theories, exploration of what goes into the decision-making picture, and various T/T 
revealed commonalities that every decision maker has to answer and influences that 
should be understood regardless of the model/theory used. Finally, an analysis of selected 
models/theories was conducted through the lens of the commonalities discovered to 
expose how information influenced the decision making process when using a selected 
model/theory.  
Information is the most important piece of the decision making process and the 
most malleable. Research and real world experiences have proven this through the 
successful influence of target decision makers and audiences by manipulating the 
information with various T/T. The success of the T/T is due to the manipulated 
information as it intersects and interacts with the target decision maker or audience. They 
see the information in a certain way and decide to behave in a manner that reaches the 
desired end state of the designed influence. There are many possible combinations to 
accomplish this but all of them revolve around manipulating information. 
This knowledge enables an influence attempt to be tailored to a targeted decision 
maker or audience. The various combinations provide an expansive set of choices (T/T) 
on how to manipulate the information in order to reach a decision maker or audience. 
Thus, the predominate sub-processes of IO can and do work to elicit the desired behavior 
from the targeted decision maker or audiences and attempts to use the same or similar 
sub-processes can be recognized prior to the influence taking place; resulting in increased 
protection of United States and our allies decision making capability. 
Therefore, information is the impetus to begin and the fuel to keep the process 
going until the decision maker thinks s/he has enough information, correctly interpreted 
to make the decision that benefits them or their goal to reach the desired end state. While 
information begins and sustains the decision making process, the decision maker controls 
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it by conflating the answers to the common criteria, the theory/model used, and his/her 
response to the information environments with the individual and collective biases of the 
decision maker and his/her advisory group.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Recommendations for future research: 
 This thesis analyzed only four of the eight relevant models and theories of 
decision making that were found. Future students could conduct an in-
depth analysis of the other four models and theories to explore how 
information influences them. 
 Conduct further research of available literature to identify more models 
and theories used in decision-making based on culture or region of the 
world. 
 Utilize NDM/RPD in order to develop an initial training pipeline that will 
be the baseline training for new junior officers in the Surface Warfare 
community. The goal of which is to produce junior officers that are aware 
of and have been exposed to the needs and demands of shipboard service 
similar to a newly winged pilot (familiar with divisional administration, 
shipboard programs, qualified in ship wide basics: damage control, 
material & maintenance, weapons qualifications, and a basic 
understanding of the handling characteristics of assigned platforms). 
 Develop a course of instruction to expose aspiring leaders to the decision-
making process. This should include an overview of the various models 
and theories that could be used, an explanation of what a mental model is 
and what goes in it, the information environment and the affects thereof, 
and how to understand what kind decision maker they are and could be. 
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